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 As defense budgets decline and traditional defense industry supplies downsize 
and consolidate, many believe that the Department of Defense (DoD) must continue to 
increase its business activities in the commercial marketplace.  This thesis is an 
examination of one such venture, as a result of acquisition reform, that explores the 
viability of using commercially produced vehicles for military use in the Department of 
Defense as light tactical trucks.   
       The National Automotive Center (NAC) has initiated a program called 
Commercially Based Tactical Truck (COMBATT) that identifies dual-need/dual-use 
automotive technologies within the Defense Department and commercial automotive 
industry.   This innovative approach is to adapt a modified commercial pick-up truck to 
perform some of the missions now assigned to the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 
Vehicle (HMMWV).   
      An economical analysis is presented to determine if the procurement of 
COMBATTs would be cost effective in augmenting the current light tactical vehicle fleet 
of HMMWVs.  Research includes analyzing production cost and anticipated operation 
and support costs.  Additionally, a cost-effectiveness analysis is performed on the 
program.  COMBATT is shown to reduce the cost of developing and procuring and 
maintaining a light tactical wheeled vehicle.  Recommendations are made for the Army’s 
future buying strategy for its Light Tactical Vehicles.  It is concluded that the services 
should meet their Light Tactical Vehicle needs with an appropriate mix of HMMWVs 
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A.   OVERVIEW  
 
The National Automotive Center (NAC) which operates under the Army’s Tank-
Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) has initiated a program identifying 
dual-need/dual-use automotive technologies within the Defense Department and 
commercial automotive industry.  Dual-use technology is defined simply as an 
application that has both military and commercial uses.  The NAC serves as the liaison 
between the Army and the commercial industry.  Their new program called 
Commercially Based Tactical Truck (COMBATT) was initiated in compliance with the 
objectives of the acquisition reform.  It is designed to leverage capability in the 
commercial industry by transferring the latest technologies to military tactical vehicles.  
This innovative approach is to adapt a modified commercial pick-up truck to perform 
some of the missions now assigned to the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
(HMMWV).  These vehicles are not intended to fully replace, but sufficiently augment 
the current light tactical vehicle fleet of HMMWVs.  
COMBATT is expected to reduce the cost of developing and procuring a new 
light tactical wheeled vehicle.  The Army and Marine Corps are both looking at 
innovative acquisition and ownership strategies established by the new acquisition 
procurement initiatives.  They are looking to replace some of their aging fleet of light 
tactical vehicles comprised of HMMWVs and Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle 
(CUCVs.)  Both services are evaluating the COMBATT program as a potential 
acquisition strategy to support requirements for Light Tactical Vehicles through fiscal 
year 2020.   Therefore, this thesis examines the viability and cost effectiveness of the 




B.   PURPOSE AND BENEFIT OF RESEARCH  
 
The general purpose of this research is to explore the viability of using vehicles 
produced from commercial production lines for military uses in the Department of 
Defense.  The specific goal of this thesis is to provide an economic analysis to determine 
if the procurement of commercially based tactical trucks (COMBATT) would be cost 
effective as a significant part of the current light tactical vehicle fleet.  This thesis will 
explore possible savings and economic benefits of a program that holds great potential 
for improving procurement processes and integrated technologies that will benefit both 
the commercial manufacturer and the government. 
 
C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
1.  Primary Research Question 
 
Is acquiring tactical trucks produced from commercial production lines cost 
effective for the Department of Defense? 
 
2.  Secondary Research Questions  
 
a.  What are the advantages and disadvantages of using commercial items to 
satisfy military requirements? 
b.  What is COMBATT?  What are the significant aspects of the COMBATT 
program? 
c.  How does COMBATT leverages commercial technology? 
d.  What are the advantages of COMBATT? 
e.  What impact will COMBATT have on the current light vehicle fleet?   
f.  What are the costs and benefits of purchasing COMBATT vehicles? 
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g. What are the benefits in selling COMBATT vehicles back to the commercial 
public? 
  
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
 
This thesis examines the viability and cost effectiveness of the COMBATT 
program.  This program was initiated in compliance with the objectives of acquisition 
reform.  It is designed to leverage capability in the commercial industry by transferring 
the latest technologies to military tactical vehicles.   
The purpose of this research is to explore the viability of using commercially 
produced vehicles for military use in the Department of Defense as light tactical trucks.  
The specific goal is to provide an economical analysis in order to determine if the 
procurement of commercially based tactical trucks (COMBATT) will be cost effective in 
augmenting the current light tactical vehicle fleet.  Research will include analyzing 
operation and support costs and the program’s cost effectiveness.   
This study will provide information required for the acquiring of COMBATT 
vehicles for the Department of Defense.  TACOM, NAC, and the Army’s Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) plan to use this thesis as an input to deliberations 
regarding procurement of COMBATT vehicles for the Army and Marine Corps.   
 
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This thesis is an economic analysis of the COMBATT program’s viability for 
future procurement.  The research methodology consists of a literature review, an 
analysis of cost of current light tactical vehicles and commercial vehicles, interviews with 
knowledgeable personnel from the Light Tactical Vehicle (LVT) Program Office and the 
National Automotive Center (NAC), and observations of COMBATT vehicle 
performances. 
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 Background information is developed from a review of the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR), the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), 
DoD Directives, research reports and papers, and defense related periodicals.  The 
research questions were answered by studying and analyzing the program documentation 
and by conduction personal interviews with experts in the LVT program office and 
experts in the commercial automotive industry.  An analysis of these interviews and 
researched combined resulted in conclusions and recommendations for the program.  
 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
 
Chapter II (Acquisition Reform and the Industrial Base) provides an overview of 
acquisition reform initiatives and the industrial base.  The current policy for 
acquisitioning commercial items is stated.  This chapter shows the efforts designed to 
integrate military with commercial emerging technologies.   
Chapter III (The Evolution of the Light Tactical Vehicle) provides a history of the 
light tactical vehicle.  It dates back to pre-World War II and shows how the original Jeep 
evolved into the HMMWV we have today.   Past commercial vehicle acquisitions are 
also addressed.   
Chapter IV (The COMBATT Program) introduces the National Automotive 
Center’s (NAC) program by outlining its purpose and intent.  This chapter contains 
specific data to be analyzed.  It included O&S Cost and address manpower cost and  
Chapter V (Analysis of COMBATT Program) analyzes the cost-effectiveness of the 
COMBATT program.   
Chapter VI (Conclusions and Recommendations) summarizes the findings of the 
research and makes recommendations for future procurements of COMBATT vehicles.  
Chapter VI concludes with a presentation of areas that warrant further research and study.     
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In past years, our acquisition programs were a legacy from a relatively stable era 
of known threats.   The adversary’s moves were fairly predictable, and long-range 
programs could be structured to meet the limited range of hostile activity faced.  This is 
obviously not the case today.   Since the end of the cold war, dramatic changes in world 
geopolitics and national security needs have caused a steady decline in the military 
budget.  Along with this decline in resources the number of threats around the globe have 
increased.  Today, we live in an uncertain and unpredictable world.  It is a world where 
individual terrorists and rogue nations can unleash firepower in many ways as terrifying 
as that of a global power.  They represent a different and difficult challenge to forces 
organized and equipped around traditional missions.  The new threats are willing to 
employ weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological and nuclear) and have access 
to much of the most advanced technology and skills through the worldwide arms market.  
Finally, they are resistant to deterrence and they often respect no boundaries, whether 
























       




Since the end of the Vietnam War, DoD’s share of the federal budget has declined 
steadily, as illustrated in Figure 2.1 above (Defense Almanac, FY 2001 Budget.)  Over 
the last decade, defense procurement budgets have been reduced even more dramatically 
than the overall defense budget.  Since 1985, the total DoD budget has declined 38%, 
with a 23% decline in Research and Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), and a 
70% decline in procurement.   The procurement budget peaked at $136.6 billion in 1985 
down to $55.8 billion in 2001 as illustrated in Figure 2.2 (data reflects 2001 dollars).  
(Defense Almanac, FY 2001 Budget) 
 
 












     
Figure 2.2 – Procurement Funding 
                 
 
Although the 2002 President’s budget calls for future increases in the defense 
budget, there are no significant increases forecast in procurement, research and 
development.  The declining budget placed tremendous pressures on defense spending, 
forcing DoD to rethink the way it procures weapon systems. Today, with the threat being 
uncertain and the enemy unknown, procurement, research and development dollars must 
be balanced against legitimate affordability concerns.   These unknowns place 
tremendous pressure on the defense acquisition system to find ways to be efficient while 
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still providing high quality equipment and supplies to our armed forces.  DoD goals are to 
achieve a more efficient and effective acquisition and logistics environment that will 
deliver high performance weapon systems and support to our warfighters in less time and 
at a lower total ownership cost.  In order to meet these goals, the Department of Defense 
must increasingly rely on an integrated civil-military industrial base vice a defense 
unique industrial base.  Currently, efforts are being made to adopt commercial best 
business practices as well as emerging technologies throughout the commercial sector in 
order to consolidated the two industrial bases into one.  
The remainder of this chapter will focus on current acquisition reform efforts 
aimed at integrating the commercial and military sector of the industrial base and the 
importance of dual use technology strategy being employed by DoD. 
 
B. ACQUISITION REFORM 
 
For years, acquisition reform initiatives have focused on streamlining the 
acquisition process.  Since the passage of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
(FASA) of 1994, the preference within the Federal Government has shifted from the 
acquisition of items developed exclusively for the Government to the acquisition of 
commercial items.  FASA made it easier to buy commercial products and services and 
was necessary to take full advantages of available and evolving technological 
innovations.  More recently, new initiatives have helped the reform take its full course 
and enhance the use of commercial items.  One of these latest efforts is with the passing 
of the new 5000 series documents and the other is with doing away with Military 
Specifications (MILSPECS) and military standards.   
 
1.   New DOD 5000 Series Documents 
 
Another significant acquisition reform effort, from the perspective of this thesis, 
occurred in 2000 with the release of the new DoD 5000 Series.  The revision of these 
documents offers some solutions and flexible approaches to accelerate the acquisition 
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process.  The application of relatively mature technology has allowed DoD to quickly 
bring innovative systems through the development cycle.  This is designed to bring 
weapon systems into the field in fewer years (5-7) than the typical 10-12 years.  The main 
factor this faster acquisition process is high priority placed on the use of mature 
commercial technology.  It is reflected in the new DoD 5000 series which states: 
 
In response to user requirements, priority consideration shall always be 
given to the most cost-effective solution over the system’s life cycle.  In 
general, decision-makers, users, and program managers shall first consider 
the procurement of commercially available products, services, and 
technologies, or the development of dual-use technologies, to satisfy user 
requirements, and shall work together to modify requirements, whenever 
feasible, to facilitate such procurements. (www.web2.deskbook.osd.mil 
Sub-Paragraph 4.2.3) 
 
Simply put, if DoD intends to field state-of-the-art systems in a cost-effective 
manner, then it must incorporate commercial items into these systems.  In the past, our 
acquisition process and practices had three main challenges that caused it to be 
inefficient.  First, the acquisition cycle took too long.  On average, a program took ten to 
twelve years from identifying requirements to fielding.  Second, our weapon systems cost 
too much.   This is partly a result of the length of cycle time.  In the past, it has not been 
unusual for weapon system requirements to be set so high that the initial estimate of the 
resources necessary to develop a weapon falls short of the mark.  By the time these 
resources are obtain and equipment is fielded, we have normally paid twice or more than 
the amount estimated initially.  Significant cost increases in weapon system programs can 
be traced to not having achieved this match between requirements and resources at 
program start (GAO Report, March 2001.)  Third, the process is incompatible with 
modern technology cycles.  By the time equipment reaches the warfighters in the fleet, 
some equipment will be obsolete.  The newly revised 5000 series incorporates a mentality 
of evolutionary acquisition as a preferred acquisition strategy.  It imposes time-based 
requirements and, for the first time, includes Total Ownership Cost (TOC) as a military 
requirement that drives industry design, procurement, and support.  DoD TOC “is 
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comprised of costs to research, develop, acquire, own, operate, and dispose of weapon 
and support systems and other equipment and real property, the costs to recruit, train, 
retain, separate and otherwise support military and civilian personnel, and all other cost 
of business operations of the DoD” (DAB, 2001.)   
In order to help clarify the goals of acquisition reform and the new 5000 rewrite, 
the former Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics) released a 
statement in January 2001 saying, “To effectively provide our warfighters with the 
technological advantage to win future conflicts, we must uniformly look first to the 
commercial marketplace before developing new systems; upgrading legacy systems; or 
procuring spare parts and support services” (Gansler, 2001.)  In order for us to take 
advantage of this opportunity, we have to vigorously study areas where commercial 
products and practices would be more economical and in the best interests of the 
Government.   
The main focus of the new DoD 5000 is delivering advanced technology to 
warfighters, reducing total ownership costs improving affordability, and deploying 
interoperability and supportability systems, and more importantly, reducing cycle time.  
In short, it is designed to improve performance with higher quality at a lower cost in less 
time.   
 
2.   Requirements and Performance-Based Acquisition  
 
Mission need is the preeminent concern in developing requirements documents.  
The Government has substantial latitude to describe its needs in terms that take advantage 
of the best industry practices available such as distribution and support options and 
methods for assuring reliability.  The essential item/service characteristics defined during 
requirements identification should not change in other stages, such as market research 
and acquisition.  Nevertheless, all members of the acquisition team must be open to 
evolving the requirements description and acquisition strategy as market research reveals 
a greater understanding of how commercial items may be used to satisfy mission needs.   
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In order to maximize competition, innovation, and interoperability, and to enable 
greater flexibility in capitalizing on commercial technologies to reduce costs, 
performance-based strategies for the acquisition of products and services shall be 
considered and used whenever practical.  For products, this includes all new 
procurements and major modifications and upgrades, as well as the reprocurement of 
systems, subsystems, and spares that are procured beyond the initial production contract 
award.  Government requirements are now stated in terms of measurable standards such 
as functions to be performed, performance required, or essential physical characteristics.  
This was a reversal of the long-standing policy which relied upon the use of military 
specifications (MILSPECS) and standards.  This promotes the use of commercial items to 
fulfill the end-user’s needs.  Stating requirements in a performance-based manner rather 
than specifying exactly how the item should be manufactured, increases the possibility 
that previously unforeseen solutions available in the commercial marketplace will emerge 
to fulfill the mission requirements.   
  
C. COMMERCIAL ITEM ACQUISITION 
 
One of the main thrusts of the recent acquisition reform initiatives was to improve 
access to the commercial marketplace by making it easier for DoD to purchase 
commercial items.   To the maximum extent possible, commercial acquisitions should be 
conducted using Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 12.  The use of FAR Part 12 
is designed to provide the Department of Defense with greater access to commercial 
markets with increased competition, better prices, new market entrants, and access to 
leading edge technology.  However, market research and analysis shall be conducted to 
determine the availability, suitability, operational supportability, interoperability, and 
ease of integration of existing commercial technologies and products and of non-
developmental items prior to the commencement of a development effort (Commercial 




1. Commercial Item Definition   
 
The commercial item definition is broad and includes any item that is of a type 
customarily used for nongovernmental purposes that has been sold, leased, or licensed or 
offered for sale, lease, or license to the general public. (FAR, Part 12)  Also included in 
the commercial item definition is any item that evolved from a commercial item as 
described above, through technical/performance advances, even if it is not yet available 
in the commercial market place, as long as it will be available in time to satisfy the 
Government’s requirements.   
A commercial item does not have to be “off- the-shelf” to be classified as 
commercial.   Commercial-off- the-shelf (COTS) items are a subset of commercial items.  
The commercial items definition is much broader than products that are presently 
available off-the-shelf.   Items that require modifications of a type customarily available 
in the commercial marketplace or minor Government unique-modifications still are 
considered commercial items.  Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), non-development 
items (NDI), and Government-off-the-shelf (GOTS) items are related to commercial 
items, but the terms are not synonymous.  Further, the fact that an item or service to be 
procured does not easily fit into the NDI or GOTS categories does not mean it is not a 
commercial item.  (Commercial Item Handbook, 2001) 
Additionally, the FAR definition of commercial item also includes services.  A 
service is considered a commercial item when it is provided in support of an item that 
meets the commercial item definition, or when it is of a type offered and sold 
competitively in substantial quantities in the commercial market based on established 
market prices for specific tasks performed under standard commercial terms and 
conditions.  Warehousing, garbage collection, transportation of household goods, and 





2.   Commercial Item Determination 
 
Because of their reliance on flexibility and the exercise of sound business 
judgment by Government acquisition personnel, commercial item policies and procedures 
rely heavily on the education, training, and professional expertise of acquisition 
personnel.  A by-product of the reliance on business judgment is wide variation in 
interpretations and application of policies and procedures.  The decision whether the 
Government’s requirements for a specific acquisition can be met by a commercial item is 
based on market research and analysis of the marketplace.  
  Through in-depth market research, the agency must determine to what extent 
commercial items or modified commercial items will meet its requirement.  When items 
available in the commercial market cannot meet the Department’s need, DoD must 
determine whether market items can be or have been modified so that FAR Part 12 can be 
used.  Two types of modifications are available: (1) modifications of a type available in 
the commercial marketplace; and (2) minor modifications of a type not customarily 
available in the commercial marketplace made to Federal Government requirements.  
(Commercial Item Handbook, 2001) For modifications of a type available in the 
commercial marketplace, the size or extent of modifications is unimportant as long as the 
item retains a predominance of nongovernmental functions or physical characteristics.    
Acquisition professionals must begin each acquisition presuming the item/service 
to be procured (even if only at a sub-system level) is available commercially.  Only after 
careful review of the commercial items definition and significant evidence that the item is 
not commercial, should they consider the item Government-unique.  Once an agency 
determines that commercial items can meet its requirement, the agency can conduct an 
acquisition in accordance with FAR Part 12. 
  
3. Common Misperceptions about Commercial Item Acquisitions  
 
Some members of the acquisition community have expressed concern that FAR 
Part 12 contracts afford the Government less assurance that the acquisition will result in 
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receipt of a high-quality product. A well-planned and constructed commercial acquisition 
could provide greater protection from poor quality than a Government-unique contract 
provides. When a commercial market exists for a product, the Government should be able 
to choose from a range of items or services that provides the best value to the 
Government. 
Additionally, a product does not have to be developed at private expense to be 
commercial. Even if the Government paid for development of a product, or a product had 
a military origin, a commercial market can subsequently develop for that product.  The 
issue of who paid for development is not part of the commercial item determination.   
Along these same lines, the presence of unique Government requirements does 
not, in and of itself, mean an item is a Government-unique item. (CommItemHandbook, 
2001) 
 
4.   Risks with Commercial Items   
 
Although Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 eliminated 
regulatory barriers to buying commercial items, the risk of departing form MILSPECS 
must be considered.  Commercial products must be able to perform in a military 
environment that may be more stressful on the component or system than in a 
commercial environment.  If the risk is low and substitution possible, then commercial 
units will generally be less expensive.   Program offices can be successful by deliberately 
pre-planning for frequent upgrades of commercial items, technology insertion, and 
retirement of obsolete items.   
There are no commercial panaceas when dealing with commercial items.  While 
there are significant benefits, these benefits can be attained only by understanding and 
addressing the significant new challenges that are driven by the fundamental differences 
between building items and buying them.  It must also be emphasized that the risks 
associated with traditional system development do not go away simply because the 
system makes use of commercial items.  Lastly, no matter how much a system is 
14 
supported by commercial items the overall system still must be engineered, developed, 
integrated, tested, delivered, sustained and managed (Commercial Item-Lessons Learned, 
2000).   
 
D. DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND ITS INDUSTRIAL BASE 
 
Along with tightening budgets, a shrinking defense industrial base has forced the 
Department of Defense to make significant changes in the way it acquires weapon 
systems.  One objective of acquisition reform initiative is to integrate commercial and 
military industrial bases to minimize costs and improve efficiency.   
Defense acquisition encompasses a variety of activities.  On one end on the 
spectrum, DoD procures relatively small quantities of major weapon systems consisting 
of complex and expensive subsystems.  At the other end lies procurement of commercial 
products characterized by large quantities of standard items with a relatively low unit 
cost.  Defense manufacturing processes are often quite different from the processes 
common in commercial manufacturing.  Traditionally, defense markets are small in scale 
and exhibit both monopsony (one customer) and monopoly (one provider) characteristics.  
Defense industry processes are often low-volume and labor intensive where designers 
emphasize performance of the products.  In sharp contrast, a primary concern for a 
commercial firm is to design the product for producibility on a highly automated, high-
volume production line.  The commercial sector realizes reduced prices through 
economies of scale by mass production.  Commercial manufacturers also contend with 
market and competitive forces that affect price.  Another advantage in the commercial 
marketplace is that the market rewards the innovative manufacturer who makes quality 
products efficiently.  The result of these processes lead to lower, stable prices, fast 
delivery of products, and satisfied consumers. 
Defense products are designed and built primarily in defense-specific plants or in 
isolated divisions of larger corporations.  Many commercial companies often segregate 
themselves from their defense counterparts to avoid the requirements unique to 
Government contracting.  Commercial companies simply cannot afford to change their 
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practices to comply with Government requirements.  Changing practices would often 
mean sacrificing their competitive position in the commercial marketplace.   
The defense industrial base consists of the prime contractors and multiple tiers of 
subcontractors that can develop and build defense weapon systems.  Recently, many 
vendor defense contractors have merged, and others have focused their efforts away from 
the defense industry due, in part, to the declining business base.  Defense contractors 
have experienced the same downsizing pressures that the Government and military have 
endured throughout the past several years.  The smaller and restructured industrial base 
has resulted in less competition, higher pricing, and a slowdown in innovation.  As the 
budget declines, affordability of future systems is becoming more and more important.  
The budget cannot continue to support the defense-unique industrial base.  In turn, with 
smaller procurements, DoD business alone is not sufficient to keep many defense-unique 
suppliers in business.  Therefore, many acquisition professionals believe that DoD must 
rely on the commercial industry to provide a significant portion of DoD’s supplies and 
services (Skibbie, 2001.)   
 
1.   Civil-Military Integration 
 
In one of his last speeches delivered before leaving the office of Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), Dr. Jacques Gansler 
stated: 
 
While the many mergers and acquisitions have been both necessary and 
desirable, there is a growing concern that we may end up with only sole 
source producers in critical defense sectors, thus eliminating the 
innovation, cost, and responsiveness benefits of competition.  A solution 
likely lies in a broadening of the defense industrial base to include 
commercial firms. (USD(AT&L) www.acq.osd.mil)  
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The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) defines civil-military integration as 
the process of merging the Defense Technology and Industrial Base and the large 
Commercial Technology and Industrial Base into a unified National Technology and 
Industrial Base.  (www.wws.princeton.edu) Civil-Military Integration can occur through 
conversion of existing defense plants to commercial products, diversification of defense 
companies into commercial product lines, or dual-use technology where a single 
production line can produce both civilian and military components.  Such actions will 
bring in commercial firms and reward all firms for high performance and lower cost and 
save DoD billions of dollars each year. 
Additionally, the benefits of integrating commercial and military production bases 
includes a wider base (both commercial and military combined) that, in concept, will 
better serve surge requirements.  To achieve this, DoD must reduce or eliminate, where 
practical, those unique terms and conditions including unique Cost Accounting Systems 
(CAS) and revert to Generally Accepted Accounting Procedures (GAAP).  This will not 
only improve the department of defense’s ability to get goods and services faster, better 
and cheaper, but will also help our domestic industrial markets. Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld recently stated, “Until we break this habit [CAS], we automatically 
exclude a large porting of the commercial industry to whom the CAS are anathema” 
(Skibbie, 2001.) 
 
2.   Dual-Use Technology  
 
Dual-use strategy is an attempt by DoD to integrate the military technology and 
industrial base with that of the commercial sector by using more commercially available 
components in its systems or using commercial production lines to manufacture unique 
military components.  DoD initiated the Dual-Use Science & Technology (DUS&T) 
program in 1997 to increase the use of dual-use technologies in defense systems.  The 
program has two primary purposes.  The first is to jointly develop dual use technologies 
with industry.  The second is to embed the concepts being developed under this and 
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earlier dual use programs in DoD and make the development of dual use technologies 
with industry a standard way of doing business throughout the DoD.   
Dual-use technology is defined as an application that has both military and 
commercial uses.  Dual-use technology is a key component in DoD’s investment strategy 
for maintaining the performance superiority and affordability of U.S. military forces in 
this new technological and economic environment.  It is a two-way program to help 
defense firms enter the commercial market and firms enter the defense market.  It is 
either 1) technology developed by the Government (DoD, defense contractors, etc.) 
which is shared with commercial industry or 2) technology developed by the commercial 
sector which is then utilized by the Government.  In past years, dual-use has been 
normally viewed as a Government-to-commercial industry relationship. However, with 
the changes in the defense industry and advancing technologies in the marketplace, the 
reverse has been occurring.  Elements of the dual-use technology strategy serve to:  
 
· Ensure that key elements of the domestic commercial 
technology base that are critical for national security 
remain at the leading edge; 
 
· Support the transitioning of defense-sponsored technology 
and the integration of military production with the 
commercial base; and 
 
· Facilitate insertion of commercial technologies into 
military systems. 
 
Moreover, some of the largest acquisition programs such as tanks, submarines, 
and nuclear warheads do not have parallel demand in the commercial market.  Therefore, 
acquisition and program management of these types of systems would not become overly 
dedicated to the DUS&T program.  There are, however, other types of systems such as 
trucks and communications that do have parallel demand in the commercial sector.  
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Additionally, there are many components of unique military systems that could be dual-
use in nature.  
There are numerous examples of projects which are implementing DoD’s dual use 
technology policy.  For example, the Air Force’s Military Products from Commercial 
Lines pilot program is demonstrating the commercial manufacture of military electronics 
modules.  Rather than being produced on a dedicated military line, the tactical fighter’s 
(Air Force’s F-22) and advanced helicopter’s  (Army’s Comanche) electronics boards 
will be processed on a commercial automotive manufacturing line.  Incorporation of 
commercially produced military avionics on military aircraft will dramatically reduce the 
cost of electronic suites by taking advantage of economies of scale and automated 
manufacturing processes.  This has resulted in 30 percent to 50 percent savings and a 
product that actually exceeds the requirement for operating in a high-temperature 
environment.  (Openshaw, 1998)    By increasing the use of dual use technologies in 
defense systems, DoD can take advantages of the same competitive pressures and market 
driven efficiencies that lead to accelerated development and cost savings in the 
commercial sector.    
 
3.   Maintaining Competition 
 
Maintaining competition is important because it clearly influences costs.  When a 
contract award or a funding of a single program will result in only one contractor 
remaining in any critical area (prime or sub), the DoD (as the sole buyer of weapons 
systems) must consider ways to maintain the potential for future competition.  In many 
programs, this means carefully considering industrial base concerns as a key ingredient in 
shaping the acquisition strategies.  
Competition is critical for providing innovation, product quality, and 
affordability.  All DoD Components shall acquire systems, subsystems, equipment, 
supplies and services in accordance with the statutory requirements for competition.  
Competition provides major incentives to industry and Government organizations to 
reduce cost and increase quality.  The Department must take all necessary actions to 
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promote a competitive environment, including 1) examination of alternative systems to 
meet stated mission needs, 2) structuring Science and Technology investments and 
acquisition strategies to ensure the availability of competitive suppliers throughout a 
program's life and for future programs, 3) ensuring that prime contractors foster effective 
competition for major and critical products and technologies, and 4) ensuring qualified 
international sources are permitted to compete.  (DoD 5000 Deskbook, 2001) 
Acquisition, technology, and logistics decisions shall be made with full consideration of 
their impacts on a competitive industrial base, including not only the prime contractor 
level but also the subcontractor level. 
Currently, there is only one sole supplier of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 
Vehicle (HMMWVs) for DoD.  It is the AM General Corporation located in South Bend, 
Indiana.  AM general has been the sole HMMWV producer since its initial contract with 
DoD in 1985.   Based on lack of competition the HMMWV has received in the past, with 
projected future quantities less than what the Army procured historically, there is a risk of 
not receiving competition of future requirements, especially with other contractors 
competing against the incumbent vehicles manufacturer.  A sole source contract with the 
incumbent HMMWV manufacturer may increase the risk of gaining a reasonable vehicle 
price.   
If DoD does not have a competitive defense industry, it looses out on both major 
weapon system objectives of affordability and high performance.  Even though the 
HMMWVs are meeting all aspects of performance as stated in the ORD, their 
procurement costs have been escalating.  Thus, it is both the government’s responsibility 
and in the government’s best interest to encourage a competitive, healthy, and 
technologically advanced defense industrial base.  (www.acq.osd.mil)  
 
4.  Affordability  
  
Performance at an affordable cost is especially important today.   Cost is a 
requirement that must be considered at every stage of our acquisition process while still 
continuing to meet essential weapon system performance.  With the reduced budget, it is 
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no longer economically viable to have a completely separate military and commercial 
base.  By integrating the two industrial bases, DoD can exploit the market-driven 
efficiencies of the commercial sector.   
 
E. THE NATIONAL AUTOMOTIVE CENTER  
 
The DUS&T program jointly funds research projects with industry for the 
development of dual-use technologies.  One such venture, which will be the focus of this 
thesis, is with a current dual-use program sponsored by the National Automotive Center 
(NAC).  The National Automotive Center (NAC), founded in 1992, is the Tank-
Automotive and Armaments (TACOM) focal point for the development of dual-
needs/dual-use automotive technologies and their application to military ground vehicles.   
The NAC accelerates the use of these technologies by fostering relationships and forming 
cost shared programs that link Government, industry and academia.  Its primary focus is 
to benefit current and future military ground vehicle systems through performance 
improvements, service life extensions, and reduction in ground vehicle life cycle costs. 
The NAC is the Army's principal conduit for development of dual-use vehicle 
technologies.  By supporting cost-shared partnerships for the development of new vehicle 
technologies, the Army is able to integrate its requirements into the design, lower the cost 
of development, and tie its requirements to the commercial marketplace, thus lowering 
the cost of acquisition, maintenance and parts replacement.  For fiscal year 2001, the 
NAC had eight Dual Use Science and Technology proposals accepted with a total budget 
of $56 million. 
The establishment of the NAC in southeast Michigan places it among 96 major 
automotive research and development centers including Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, 
Honda, Hyundai, Mazda, Nissan, Saturn, Toyota and Volkswagen. In addition to these 
organizations, over 85% of the nation's automotive supplier technical centers are located 
in Michigan.  With over 60% of U.S. automotive engineers living and working in 
Michigan, the NAC resides in the heart of a concentrated source of automotive expertise 
unmatched anywhere in the country. 
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As a result of collaboration and partnering with industry, last year the National 
Automotive Center (NAC) unveiled its first Commercially Based Tactical Truck 
(COMBATT) demonstration vehicle.  This innovative approach to dual-use technology 
will adapt a commercial pick-up truck to perform some missions now assigned to the 
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV).  This basis of this program 
will be explained in detail in later chapters.   
 
 
F.    SUMMARY 
 
We are in an era of unprecedented change in the make-up and nature of the 
national and defense industrial bases.  Dramatic changes in the world threat combined 
with the declining defense budget have forced acquisition professionals to rethink the 
way DoD procures its weapon systems.  During the past few years, the Department of 
Defense has embarked on an ambitious and challenging acquisition reform effort.   
Acquisition reform initiatives have focused on making it easier for DoD to 
procure commercial assets.  Tapping the commercial market is an important step towards 
integrating the commercial and military sectors of the industrial base.  New acquisition 
policies have been geared to achieving that objective.  We must expand the use of 
commercial items in the Department of Defense systems so we can leverage the massive 
technology investments of the private sector reaping the benefits of reduced cycle times, 
faster insertion of new technologies, lower life cycle costs, greater reliability and 
availability, and support from a robust industrial base.  To accomplish this, we must 
capitalize on the technical advances in the commercial market place by carefully 
reviewing our specifications to determine where they can be altered to enable the 
Department of Defense to leverage the commercial sector.  
The bottom line is that our traditional processes and strategies for acquiring, 
developing, fielding and supporting weapons and business systems must now be adapted 
to the modern world.  The next chapter discusses how the industrial base was first called 































A.  THE ORIGINAL JEEP 
 
The history of the light tactical vehicle spans over 60 years.  The original truck, 
General Purpose (GP) or Jeep was born of necessity and hand-built in just seven weeks.  
As early as World War I, the U.S. Army looked for a fast, lightweight reconnaissance 
vehicle.  The Army wanted a universal vehicle to replace the aging motorcycles with 
sidecar from WWI.  In the early 1940s, the need to rapidly deve lop this vehicle became 
more urgent as the Axis powers scored victories in Europe and Northern Africa.  The 
Army put out a call to automobile manufacturers asking for a prototype for such a 
vehicle.  This vehicle had to meet certain military specifications:  such as a payload 
capacity of 600 pounds, wheelbase under 75 inches, fold-down windshield, gross vehicle 
weight less than 1200 pounds, and four-wheel drive.  Of 135 companies invited to 
compete in the contest, only three companies entered, American Bantam Car Company, 
Willys-Overland Motors, and Ford Motor Company. 
(www.storm.ca/~seanm/miljeeps/history.html) 
American Bantam Car Company was the first to submit a design within the 
required time (49 days) and was awarded the initial contract of 70 jeeps.  The prototype 
vehicle, called the ‘Bantam’, was delivered to the Army in September 1940.  Willys-
Overland produced their model called ‘Quad’ and delivered it to the Army on November 
13, 1940.  Although heavier and more powerful, it was otherwise virtually identical to the 
‘Bantam’.  Ford produced their model called ‘Pygmy’, and delivered it to the Army in 
December 1940.  It also resembled the ‘Bantam’.  Many suspected that Willys-Overland 
and Ford were both given access to Bantam's blueprints by the U.S. Army.  American 
Bantam protested, but nothing came out of it.  Nevertheless, there were some concerns 
about American Bantam’s limited production capability after the first 70 vehicles were 
produced given the emerging need for a very large number of these vehicles.  As a result, 
a political decision was made in March 1941 that all three companies would receive an 
initial order for 1,500 vehicles each, provided that they met the original specification.    
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In July 1941, the military decided that standardization was needed amongst the three 
designs.  It was impractical to operate and maintain three different designs.   
During initial testing, all three vehicles performed well but it was decided that 
Willys-Overland’s design represented the best overall value for the money at $739, 
compared with $1166 for a ‘Bantam’.  Willys-Overland’s vehicle, called ‘Willys’ by 
servicemen, were adopted as the standard Army vehicle and secured the contract to 
provide the next 16,000 vehicles.  Although American Bantam Car Company was the 
first to design and build jeeps for the Army, their role in Jeep history ended after their 
initial delivery of vehicles.   By the end of October 1941, the Army was keen to find a 
second source of supply for two reasons:  1) Willys-Overland could no longer keep up 
with the growing demand for jeeps, and 2) there was the need to safeguard the supply of 
jeeps against the Willys plant being bombed or sabotaged.  Therefore, in early November, 
Ford was awarded an additional contract to build 15,000 jeeps to the Willys design 
specification.  Willys-Overland and Ford would land many follow-on contracts for jeeps.  
In fact, during World War II, Willys and Ford filled orders for more than 700,000 of 
these vehicles. 
The Willys’ jeeps were the heroes of World War II.  They served in every theater 
of war, in every conceivable role and with every allied army.  Jeeps changed the way 
Americans looked at the automobile and added a new word to our vocabulary.  After the  
war, there was a considerable demand for the jeep.  Servicemen were so impressed that 
many wanted jeeps of their own after returning home.  Minor alterations to the 
transmission, transfer case, axle ratios and steering made it available and more desirable  
for the domestic market.  (http://ourworld.compuserve.com/) 
With the outbreak of the Korean conflict, Willys-Overland designed an improved 
version of the WWII Jeep, the M38 utility truck and its later version the M38A1.   In all, 
over 150,000 vehicles were produced, including 5,000 M170 front line ambulances in 
which the basic body and chassis of the M38A1s were extended to accommodate litter 
patients.      
The military jeep known as the M151, came as a result of Ford Motor Company 
being awarded the contract for development of replacements for the aging military 
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vehicle fleet of WWII and Korea.  It began in 1951 under a program known as the 
Military Utility Tactical Truck Project (MUTT).  It became known as a most reliable 
vehicle suitable for multipurpose roles and applications.  The MUTT became 
standardized for American and allied countries in 1960 and was the replacement vehicle 
for the M38A1.  The M151 is a large departure from previous jeeps, both in looks and 
design.  This Vietnam-era Jeep featured a split windshield and a horizontally-slotted 
stamped steel front grille.  Although larger in size, the M151 was the same weight as a 
World War II jeep.  Along with Ford, Kaiser Company (former Willys-Overland) and 
AM General also manufactured M151s during the 1960s. (www.texasmuseum.org)  
Figure 3.1 below displays a brief history of the first light tactical vehicles.   
 
 
1940 -  American Bantam Car Company awarded contract for the first 
four-wheel drive, ¼ ton utility truck. American Bantam produced only 
the initial 70 units.  The “Bantam” is the undisputed first "jeep." 
 
1941 -  Subsequent jeep contracts were given to Willys-Overland and 
Ford. The Willys’ “Quad” marked the beginning of Willys' dominance 
of the series. Ford built the “Pygmy” which was the third of the 
vehicles involved in the fierce, three-way competition that marked the 
opening chapter of the Jeep legend. During World War II, Willys-
Overland and Ford filled more than 700,000 orders for the Army. 
 
1950 -  Willys-Overland built improved Jeeps, the M38 and M38A1, 
that were used in the Korean War. A total of 61,423 M38s and 101,488 
M38A1s were produced in all.   
 
1960 -  Ford begins producing the M151 “Military Unit Tactical Truck” 
(MUTT) to replace the M38A1s. Kaiser Jeep (former Willys-Overland) 
and AM General also produced M151s. Of the 120,000 total produced 
during the Vietnam era, AM General produced 95,000 of them. 
 
1981 - HMMWV contract awarded to AM General in 1981 with 
production starting in 1983.  Since then, more than 150,000 HMMWVs 
have been delivered to the U.S. Armed Forces and over 30 friendly 
overseas nations.  The HMMWV is recognized throughout the world as 
the most durable and most serious 4X4 wheeled vehicle with credible 
combat experience in Panama and the Persian-Gulf War.  
 
Figure 3.1 – Brief History of the Light Tactical Vehicle 
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B. MODERNIZING THE FLEET 
 
The end of an era came to a close in 1981.  “The combat experience of the 1970’s, 
together with the changing methods of conducting land warfare around the world, called 
for a comprehensive wheeled combat system that would be air transportable, versatile, 
reliable, maintainable and survivable.  This is what the U.S. Armed Forces wanted in the 
design of the new M998 Series, 1-1/4 ton, 4x4 multipurpose vehicle.  In 1981, three 
major U.S. companies set about developing such a vehicle to meet these requirements.  
The result:  On March 22, 1983, AM General was awarded a contract for the production 
of the Highly Mobile Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), dubbed the 
Hummer.”  (McGrady, 1999)  
The armed forces ended their orders for jeeps and a new vehicle was ushered in, 
the HMMWV.  The HMMWV, which isn't referred to as a jeep, original design shows 
how far automotive design has progressed since the original ‘Bantam’.  Known officially 
as the M998 series and nicknamed ‘Hummer’, this vehicle satisfied the need for superior 
mobility in a tactical field environment.  It is versatile, mobile, and fast, and replaced 
most M151s and an assortment of other vehicles to include all M274s (1/4-ton Mules), all 
M561s (1-1/2-ton Gama Goats), and some M880s (1-1/4-ton pick-up trucks). It has 
symbolized the modern Army just as the Jeep symbolized the Army during WWII.   
The initial contract awarded to AM General Division of LTV Aerospace and 
Defense (now AM General Corporation) was executed over five years, producing 55,000 
vehicles for a sum of $1.2 billion (www.amgeneralcorp.com.) AM General is the world 
leader in the design, engineering and production of military and special purpose vehicles, 
with more than 60 years of experience.  Since production of HMMWVs began in 1983, 
the company has delivered more than 150,000 of the versatile, 4-wheel drive vehicles to 
the U.S. Armed Forces and over 30 friendly overseas nations.   
The HMMWV is the cornerstone of the contemporary light tactical fleet.  It has 
been in continuous use since initial production in 1983.  It meets the basic needs for troop 
transport, cargo hauling, ambulance services, and serving as a prime mover for towed 
equipment.  Originally designed as a weapons platform for vehicle mounted machine 
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guns, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, it is more than what is needed for many garrison 
missions.  There is some consensus that the HMMWV is overbuilt for many mundane 
daily chores, such as hauling troops and general cargo.   
The Army is the lead service for HMMWV development and procurement.  The 
HMMWV serves in many roles and is used throughout the Army, Air Force, Navy and 
Marines at more than 350 locations worldwide.  The HMMWV has been living with the 
‘commonality ‘ concept over the past years.  The HMMWVs have common power train, 
subsystems, and chassis in order to have a logistical advantage of common parts, 
maintenance tasks, and special tools.  This concept ensures that the HMMWV is 
sustainable on the battlefield.  Additionally, commonality of parts reduces the amount of 
spare parts the force must stock to ensure the readiness of the vehicles.   
The Army purchased a large number of HMMWVs early in the acquisition cycle 
during the early 1980s.  These earlier vehicles (Block 1s) are now approaching 20 years 
of age.  Many are as old as their drivers.  As the Department of Defense conducts 
upgrades and Extended Service Programs (ESPs), the HMMWV fleet becomes even 
older.  The Economic Useful Life (EUL) of the HMMWV is 15 years.  However, most 
vehicles are pushed to 20 years or more.  The Economic Useful Life (EUL) serves as the 
timeframe for replacing or upgrading the current fleet to prevent obsolescence defined as 
reaching the end of useful life, and no longer mission capable.  The 15-year EUL of the 
HMMWV used throughout this thesis is based on Tank Automotive and Armaments 
Command (TACOM) Fleet Planning Office (FPO) analys is of HMMWV (M998) fleet 
data.   
With many of our HMMWVs approaching their end of service life, the cost to 
maintain these vehicles has increased accordingly. Historically, an aging fleet is likely to 
produce increased O&S costs.  In the Army and Marine Corps today, operating forces 
have aging vehicles with increasingly expensive Operation and Support (O&S) costs.  
This practice is directly contrary to Army goals and policies.  Vehicles aging affect 
operational readiness as obsolescence reduces the number of available mission capable 
systems.  By FY03, over 50% of the HMMWVs in the fleet will exceed their 15-year 
Economic Useful Life (EUL) (McGrady, 1999) 
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1.   Acquisition Strategy  
     
In 1998, Congress directed that the Army conduct an analysis to provide 
analytical insights and underpinnings that support the Army’s strategy for acquiring and 
supporting the light tactical vehicle (LTV) fleet through FY 2020.   This strategy focuses 
on maintaining current HMMWV production; modernizing the fleet; and recapitalizing 
the Army’s initial investment in the aging fleet through an Extended Service Program 
(ESP)  (McGrady, 1999.)  
The current HMMWV procurement strategy is to maintain production with seven-
year, iterative modernization upgrades (PM-LTV, 2001.)  Today’s light fleet 
modernization centers on continued production of the HMMWVA2.  Along with the A2s, 
current production activities focus on the Heavy HMMWV for customers needing to 
place a variety of systems onto the HMMWV chassis.  The other piece of production is 
the Up-Armored HMMWV.  This variant, the M1114, is for units requiring upgraded 
mine and ballistic protection.  Currently, a shortage exists in these two variants in the 
Army today. Therefore, this part of the strategy is for attaining the proper balance of 
these two HMMWV variants Army wide.   
The second part of the strategy is the modernization piece.  The modernization 
component calls for competition for a new contract every seven years (five year multi-
year plus two additional option years) with the vehicles integrating all available 
technology improvements to meet the new HMMWV ORD.   The upgrade from the A2 
model will be a block improvement program to produce a more capable HMMWV 
without performing a major redesign of the vehicle.  There are things that will be added 
such as, an anti- lock breaking system, and sound-proofing the interior of the vehicle.   
The user requirement for the HMMWV has necessitated the request for improved 
capabilities of the HMMWV.  As of the writing of this thesis, a TRADOC approved 
HMMWV ORD, is on its way up for Department of the Army approval.  The current 
version of the ORD sets the stage for what the next generation HMMWV will be.  In the 
next seven-year upgrade, which will start approximately six years from now, the Army 
will focus on those key performance parameters that they will need to meet Force XXI 
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objectives.   As the Army After Next (AAN) requirements and technology evolve, the 
need for a new system emerges.  It is intended that this process be continued and updated 
in approximately seven-year cycles and the ORD requirements updated to keep pace with 
military needs.   
The third component of HMMWV modernization strategy focuses on the 
recapitalization.  This phase focuses on all the aged HMMWVs between 12-13 years old.  
The objective of the recapitalization program is to extend the life of the over-age 
HMMWVs by 21 years while enhancing performance and minimizing O&S cost.  An 
Extended Service Program (ESP) for the HMMWVs is scheduled to commence in FY05, 
when the  average age of the vehicles will be 17 or 18 years old.  However, as of the 
writing of this thesis, no production dollars have been approved for the HMMWV 
recapitalization.   
 
2. Next Generation HMMWV 
 
In October of 2001, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) reassessed the 
Army’s operational requirements for HMMWVs and approved the HMMWV 
Operational Requirements Documents (ORD).  The intent of the ORD update is to 
incorporate light tactical fleet changes occurring since the last HMMWV ORD was 
published in 1998.  It is currently being reviewed at HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) for approval.   This ORD identifies capabilities not 
found in the current HMMWV and which are required to meet the needs of the future 
battlefield.  Some of these requirements are stated in the passage below:  
 
As the Army transition to the Interim Force and the Interim Brigade 
Combat Teams (IBCT), a critical need exists for a highly mobile, multi-
capable light tactical wheeled vehicle capable of transporting greater 
payloads than the originally fielded HMMWVs, while attaining the 
performance (mobility and transportability) levels of the originally fielded 
HMMWVs.  This vehicle is required for Interim and current forces and 
will be present as the Army transitions to the Objective Force.  This multi-
capable vehicle will be employed throughout the entire battlefield; 
although it’s primary anticipated use is by selected units at division level 
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and below which have an operational requirement to routinely and 
customarily operate in off-road and cross-country environments, and by 
units that routinely conduct route reconnaissance and classification.  It will 
function as a deployable, mobile platform for numerous systems that 
contribute directly to the warfight (HMMWV ORD.) 
 
The updated ORD is intended to articulate thresholds that focus on reflecting 
realistic requirements for today’s fleet and objectives that reflect the requirements 
necessary to meet projected Force XXI requirements.  Program risks associated with this 
strategy being applied to the existing HMMWV are that KPPs may not allow sufficient 
flexibility to meet cost objectives.  There is risk that without careful consideration, 
interrelated requirements will result in actual physical impossibilities.   
 
C. COMMERCIALLY-BASED TACTICAL VEHICLE PROGRAMS 
 
In dire need to replace dilapidated jeeps in the early 1980s, the U.S. Army bought 
commercial pick-up trucks along with HMMWVs.  Introduced in 1983, the Commercial 
Utility Cargo Vehicle (CUCV) met the military need for a commercially based tactical 
support vehicle.  The CUCV is a commercial non-development item based on the full-
size Chevrolet pick-up and Blazer.  It is a 5/4-ton, 4X4 vehicle with cargo, shelter, and 
ambulance variants.   
Originally, the CUCV was designed to replace the M880 gas-engine commercial 
vehicles that were fielded in 1976.  It also was intended to augment the HMMWV in 
replacing the high density of M151s throughout the services.  The HMMWV Joint 
Mission Element Need Statement (JMENS) of 1980 appears to have been the MNS for 
the CUCV which called for the Army to procure commercial vehicles as “substitutes for 
those wheeled vehicles in the ¼ thru 1-1/4 ton category whose mission or role will 
permit, and ruggedization is not required, and whose replacement by a HMMWV is not 
cost effective.” (Welker, 1980)  After being procured and fully fielded, it became 
apparent that some of these CUCVs didn’t perform sufficiently in some of the units they 
went to.  Many went to combat and combat support units where a more robust and mobile 
vehicle was required for tactical movements.  Nonetheless, the CUCV was new, the jeeps 
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were old, and some planners mistakenly sent them to front-line units that needed a 4X4 
vehicle.   
During Operation Desert Shield/ Storm of the Persian-Gulf War in 1990, some of 
these vehicles were sent to the front line combat support units in the deserts of Southwest 
Asia and the results were disastrous.  The CUCVs exhibited insufficient cross-country 
mobility and were unable to keep up with the tactical movement of other military trucks.  
These trucks were essentially commercial pick-up trucks with camouflage paint.  They 
were not robust enough for significant off-road operations.  In turn, the CUCV suffered a 
bad reputation for two reasons:  1) the performance gap between the CUCV and the 
HMMWV was significant, and 2) it was fielded to units that should not have had it.  The 
CUCVs have since been relegated to primarily on-road service in non-maneuver elements 
because of its limited mobility and unsuitability for military operations in severe or 
hostile environments.  Even though it was later realized that it was a fielding error which 
caused CUCVs not perform to their capability, this bad reputation has been carried over 
into the current acquisition strategy that consciously omits buying any commercial 
vehicles for the light tactical fleet.   
 
MACOM DENSITY
U.S. Army Special Operations Command 18
U.S. Army Reserve 4,993
U.S. Army Europe 467
Forces Command 154
Army National Guard 11,270
U.S. Army Pacific 65
U.S. Army Europe 25
Training and Doctrine Command 571
U.S. Army South 1
U.S. Army Material Command 544
Total 18,108
   
Figure 3.2 – Major Army Commands Density List of CUCVs 
             (From OPMIS Relational Database, 2000) 
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Less than 50% of the original Army fleet remains in service.  Today, about 88% 
of the CUCV fleet is in the Army National Guard or reserve component or storage, and 
less than 1% of the Army’s overseas fleet of light tactical vehicles is comprised of the 
CUCV.  (TACOM Fleetbook, 1998)  Figure 3.2 above shows the density of CUCVs at 
major Army commands:   
The CUCV is at the end of its economic useful life.  Many CUCVs are not being 
replaced after being retired.  This is creating a readiness problem for some units due to 
not having any 4X4 capability.  The current breakout of the light tactical vehicle fleet of 
HMMWVs and CUCVs are shown in Figure 3.3.  The HMMWVs make up about 84% of 




    Figure 3.3 – 2001 Light Tactical Fleet 
   
From 1983 to 1986, General Motors Corporation delivered over 70,000 CUCVs 
to armed forces in the US and overseas.  There are still over 18,000 of these vehicles, 
now 15-17 years old, in the light vehicle inventory.  These vehicles are now outdated, 
don’t have sufficient mobility or capacity for many military needs.  They, as well as the 
thousands of over-age HMMWVs, will soon have to be replaced by newer vehicles.  In 











HMMWV due to the limited mobility of the Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle (CUCV).  
Then, in 1996, the DCSOPS directed that the entire fleet be “pure-fleeted” with the 
HMMWV which has become the mainstay of the Army’s light tactical vehicle fleet 
(McGrady, 1999a.)  It was directed that the entire light vehicle fleet be “pure-fleeted.”  
Based on this pure-fleet strategy, the CUCV requirements will be eliminated and all light 
vehicle requirements will become HMMWV requirements.  CUCVs are expected to be 
eliminated from the fleet by 2003.  (TACOM Fleetbook, 1998)   
 
D. A RAPID ACQUISITION SUCCESS MODEL  
 
Acquiring commercial vehicles is nothing new.  The military has acquired 
commercial light vehicles with contracts that included commercial logistics support.  The 
Army Rangers currently use the British made Land Rover Defender Model 110 as its 
Ranger Special Operations Vehicle (RSOV).  The RSOV was originally fielded in 1992 
as a replacement for the M151 series jeeps.  These vehicles provide each of the three 
battalions in the U.S. Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment with a versatile, multi-configuration 
tactical transportation platform capable of moving Rangers and their equipment in a 
variety of operational environments.         
 The Marine Corps has successfully procured a commercial vehicle to replace its 
last remaining M-151s Fast Attack Vehicle (FAV) that are deployed with its Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) forces.  The Marine Corps needs capability for fast attack 
vehicular maneuver when operating in the littorals.  Therefore, in May of 1999, a search 
commenced for an interim vehicle.  The Interim Fast Attack Vehicle (IFAV) is a short 
term (1999-2003) commercially procured item that addressed the need for a diesel 
powered, helicopter internally-transportable solution.  The IFAV overcomes the 
deficiencies of safety, lack of speed, difficulty in maintenance and use of gasoline as a 
fuel that existed in the old M-151 vehicle.   
 The Statement of Need (SON) letter was signed in May 1999 for an interim 
replacement.  The market research focused on rapid acquisition to meet the requirement, 
making maximum use of best commercial practices outlined in the Federal Acquisition 
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Regulations (FAR) Part 2 and 12.  In June 1999, the announcement went out to 
commercial vendors for an open firm-fixed price contract for sixty-two IFAVs.  They 
were obtained through a competitive bid process that required a commercial-off-the-shelf 
vehicle that could be ready for use quickly.  Two weeks later, the contract was awarded 
to Advanced Vehicle Systems of Washington, D.C., a contractor for Daimler-Chrysler, 
for a commercially modified version of the Mercedes long bed version of the MB290 GT.  
The Mercedes MB290 GT is world-class, high quality four-wheel drive off-road vehicle.  
The Marines’ version, called the ‘Gelundeswagon’ is a cross between a World War II 
vintage jeep and a mini-pickup truck.    
 The entire contracting process took less than 60 days from receipt of the IFAV 
requirement to award.  In December 1999, AVS had modified and delivered to the 
MEUs, all 62 vehicles built at the production facility in Graz, Austria.  The entire 
procurement and fielding effort took less than seven months from requirement generation 
to throughput of delivery.  These vehicles were hurried to deploying combat units as a 
replacement for the M151 jeeps, which had been notoriously hard to maintain and prone 
to roll over.  In this age of acquisition reform, this was a success story for the acquisition 
community.  It raised the bar to a new level and provided the benchmark for non-wartime 
procurement.  The IFAV was procured more quickly than any previous combat vehicle in 
the Marine Corps.  Using commercial business practices, the acquisition program for the 
IFAV was condensed from the typical ten or more years down to the span of six months.  
The Marine Corps has procured and fully fielded a quality commercial based tactical 
vehicle at a price 33% lower than originally envisioned, with full contractor logistics 
support (www.acq-ref.navy.mil.)   
 Currently, the Marine Corps is looking for a permanent replacement for the 
IFAVs in which the final solution will be called Internally Transportable Vehicle (ITV).  






E.  SUMMARY 
 
For a period of over 60 years and three major wars in all, the Jeep established a 
record of reliability and proven performance under a wide range of operational areas 
worldwide.  It will go into military transportation hall of fame as a vehicle which served 
its country well.   The HMMWV ushered in a new era much like the original jeep 
experience back in the early 1940s.  It has no peer in sight for the foreseeable future.  
Vehicles with commercial heritage such as the CUCVs have shown that they can also 
complement the light tactical fleet by taking on some of the on-road missions and 
diverting the more strenuous ones for the HMMWV.   Nevertheless, some HMMWVs 
and most CUCVs are approaching 20 years of service and are in need of retirement or 
replacement.  The Marine Corps’ IFAV program has provided valuable lessons for 
follow-on programs and has set new standards for rapid, streamlined commercial 
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The National Automotive Center (NAC), which operates under the Army’s Tank-
Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM), serves as a liaison between the Army 
and the commercial auto industry.   One of NAC’s missions is to help the Army 
modernize its vehicles by adopting state-of-the art commercial technology from the 
civilian sector.  Last year, the National Automotive Center (NAC) unveiled its first 
Commercially Based Tactical Truck (COMBATT) demonstration vehicle.  COMBATT is 
a two-year-old program managed by Veridian-ERIM International of Ann Arbor, 
Michigan.  The program tests the viability of ruggedizing up commercial pickup trucks 
for military uses such as carrying general cargo and troops.  Its objective is to modify a 
pickup truck to perform some of the missions now assigned to the HMMWV.  The 
program is expected to reduce the cost of developing and procuring a new light tactical 
vehicle by leveraging the commercial base and transferring the latest technologies to 
military tactical vehicles.  The majority of the savings would result from a drastic 
reduction in the cost of ownership or life cycle costs.  Further savings could be realized 
from the use of Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) by adopting the Original Equipment 
Manufacturer’s (OEM) existing parts distribution network and logistics, reducing 
inventories during peacetime.   Additionally, the opportunity exists for commercial resale 
of used platforms to recycle some of the procurement dollars spent on these systems back 
into new procurement.  These areas of potential cost savings will be presented in this 
chapter and analyzed in the following chapter.   
 
B. THE COMBATT PROGRAM 
 
In 1998, Congress directed the Army to conduct an Analysis of Alternatives 
(AoA) to determine if there was a cost effective alternative to the current HMMWV.  At 
the time of the AoA, COMBATT was in its infancy and not mature enough to provide a 
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detailed system description of a commercially based tactical truck.  The first phase of 
COMBATT was essentially a technology demonstration.  It demonstrated the ability to 
merge commercial automotive technologies and future military light vehicle needs.  
Technology from this program such as anti- lock braking systems (ABS) and reduced 
interior noise was brought into the modernization plans for the HMMWV.  Thus, the 
commercial truck in the study (AoA) was based on a generically defined commercial 
vehicle.   The alternatives in the AoA were considered to be a replacement effort for the 
HMMWV.  The commercial truck alternative could not meet many of the requirements 
based on the HMMWV ORD at that time.  The results of the AoA was the Army’s 
current LTV strategy which called for continued HMMWV acquisition, upgrade, and 
support through FY2020 (McGrady, 1999.)   
In 1999, commercial auto manufacturers, working in alliance with the Army’s 
National Automotive Center (NAC) in Detroit, attested that they could deliver high-
performance, light trucks for military use.  Ford and Daimler-Chrysler each have 
provided prototypes for the COMBATT vehicle.  General Motors is currently building its 
prototype.  COMBATT prototype vehicles have been successfully tested over 1000 miles 
of rugged terrain at the Nevada Automotive Test Center (NATC). Evaluations of these 
vehicles indicate that Modified Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (M-COTS) vehicles are 
capable of handling most of the non-combat duties of the HMMWV.  The big three in 
automotive manufacturing (Ford, GM, Daimler Chrysler) have a continued interest in 
pursuing a competitive production contract with the Army.   
COMBATT would have an average lifespan of 10 years (COMBATT ORD, 
Appendix A.)  The vehicles will be produced on the same line as their civilian 
counterparts, the Ford F-350 and Dodge Ram 2500.  Each will receive military upgrades 
including air-adjustable suspension, electronically controlled shock absorbers, tire-
inflation systems and heavy-duty axle differentials.  They will be capable of providing 
tactical standard mobility required for infrequent off- road operations over selected terrain 
with the preponderance of operations on primary and secondary roads.    
COMBATT’s maximum gross vehicle weight is 4,100 pounds.   They are 
outfitted with 37-inch tires with a run-flat system.  The truck’s ride height, tire pressure, 
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and firmness automatically adjust to the driving conditions.  COMBATT is equipped 
with diesel engines and are 30-40 percent more fuel-efficient than current HMMWVs.  It 
meets military requirements of traversing 30-inch deep water and operating in -50 to 120 
degree temperatures.  It also has an upgraded electrical system providing 12, 24, and 110-
V power.  The interior includes global positioning system (GPS) hardware, computer 
monitors, infrared night vision displays, and collision-warning devices.   
A prototype vehicle of COMBATT is projected to meet approximately 91.4% of 
the HMMWVA2 Operational Requirement Document (ORD) requirements (See 
Appendix B.) Nevertheless, knowing that COMBATT is not likely to not meet all the 
expectation for the updated ORD, there is the up front assumption that these vehicles will 
not fully replace, but could augment, the current fleet of HMMWVs.  COMBATT can 
supplement the military light vehicle fleet by replacing HMMWVs and CUCVs in 
selected units and assignments where the full capability of the HMMWV is not required.  
This will make supplanted HMMWVs available for distribution to units that have a 
greater need for that platform.  COMBATT can be used as a command, control, and 
communications platform, shelter carrier, medical evacuation platform, and to transport 
ammunition, light cargo, and personnel.  The HMMWV’s primary missions would 
include, fording, traveling at high speeds on rough ground, armored operations, carrying 
weaponry, and mobility in terrain where a commercial truck would never be able to go.   
In order to avoid the many problems encountered by the fielding and deployment 
of the CUCVs, these vehicles would deploy to units that operate in rear areas of the 
battlefield, and in installations and training support roles.  Examples of these include 
units at echelons Corps and above, some combat services support units, and training 
commands which spend most of their time on hard surfaced roads and don’t require the 
extreme cross-country mobility of the HMMWV.   
  
C.  LIFE-CYCLE COST OF VEHICLES 
 
The decision to field a new system requires a commitment to multi-year support.  
Decisions to develop, procure, and support new systems are based on many factors, one 
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of which is the projected cost of the systems over their operational lifetime or Life Cycle 
Cost (LCC).  Life-cycle cost is the total cost, whether direct or indirect, recurring or 
nonrecurring, to the Government for a program over its life span (Deskbook, 2000.)  
Components are research and development, procurement, operations and support and 
disposal.  Figure 4.1 illustrates a typical program’s life-cycle and shows how its various 
phases related to the phases of a system’s life-cycle cost.   
Operating and support costs constitute a major portion of the system life-cycle 
costs, approximately 64% (OSD CAIG, 1992.)  Hence, Operating and Support (O&S) 
costs are considered critical in the evaluation of acquisition alternatives (USD(AT&L), 
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Figure 4.1 – Life-Cycle Cost Diagram 




















1. Operating and Support Cost (O&S)  
 
Operating and Support (O&S) includes all cost resulting from operations, 
maintenance, and support of a weapon system after it is accepted into the DoD inventory.  
It encompasses cost for personnel, consumable and repairable materials, organizational, 
intermediate and depot maintenance, facilities, and sustaining the equipment (Deskbook, 
2000.)  Many military leaders and defense analysts believe that increases in the O&S 
costs of aging equipment have created a budgetary crisis.  We cannot replace much of our 
equipment in the near future.  Consequently, operations and maintenance costs will 
continue to escala te.  Unless we reverse the trend, we can face what is called a ‘death 
spiral’.  This is a situation where increased O&S cost requires removing more and more 
dollars from equipment modernization, further delaying modernization, which in turn 
causes aging equipment to be over-used, further increasing O&S (CBO Report, 2001.)   
The effects of aging are likely to become increasingly important because, even 
with planned purchases of new equipment, many Light Tactical Vehicles (LTVs) will 
increase significantly in average age during the coming decade.  Therefore, determining 
the best time to replace or remanufacture LTVs based on affordability and mission 
effectiveness is essential to fleet management.  Buying new LTVs to replace assets before 
they have reached the  end of their useful life would be an ill-advised use of scarce 
procurement funds.  On the other hand, keeping assets beyond their useful life leads to 
unacceptable O&S costs, and is generally accompanied by a decrease in wartime 
operational effectiveness.  Economic Useful Life (EUL) is used to provide a sound basis 
for fleet-wide life-cycle management policies, which can minimize peacetime operating 
costs while maintaining the required wartime capability.  In the broadest sense, the EUL 
provides the Army’s with a tool to gauge the condition of the existing fleet and to help 
plan for future retirements, upgrades, and acquisitions (CEAC, 2001.)   




2.  Maintenance Manpower  
             
The selection, design, development, maintenance, and support concepts for a 
defense system influence how its O&S costs are analyzed and evaluated.  In order to 
compare system alternatives fully, it is also necessary to identify maintenance and 
manpower requirements.  For example, the number of crew members needed to operate a 
weapon system may be identical regardless of the alternative selected.  However, the 
reliability of alternative systems may result in very different maintenance manning and 
materiel costs.  Analysis in Chapter Five identifies the maintenance manpower 
requirements associated with COMBATT and the HMMWV.   
 
3.   Contractor Logistics Support  
 
Due to the increasing use of commercial items within DoD, there has been a 
growing demand for commercial logistics and maintenance support.  Contractor Logistics 
Support (CLS) is a method of obtaining support for a product or service for a specified 
period of time.  It may be implemented to provide total support for a product or system, 
or specific functions such as maintenance, supply and distribution, training, informa tion 
technology, and software/hardware support.  CLS is an effective means to support ground 
equipment, ground weapon systems, munitions and information systems under the 
appropriate conditions.   Operating and support costs may be lowered by utilizing 
Contractor Logistics Support (CLS.)   
 
D. COST EFFECTIVENESS OF COMBATT 
 
Cost analysis alone is not sufficient for a complete assessment of light tactical 
vehicle alternatives.  The effectiveness of each alternative in fulfilling its mission 
requirements must also be examined.   A ratio can be developed to measure cost-
effectiveness in terms of cost per unit of outcome of effectiveness.  This ratio involves 
computing the ratio of the input to the output for two alternatives.   
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The key factors in finding the optimum solution is the ability of a system to meet 
its Key Performance Parameters (KPP) while keeping within cost constraints.  KPPs are 
those system capabilities or characteristics considered essential for successful mission 
accomplishment.  For tactical wheeled vehicles, these critical areas are payload, 
performance, maintainability, and interoperability.   
In addition to KPPs, a System Effectiveness Ratio (SER) is used to assess how 
well a vehicle meets the requirements of a particular mission.   It is derived using a 
variety of Key Performance Parameter calculations.  For each mission area, a vehicle is 
evaluated on payload, mobility, transportability, and reliability and maintainability.  Each 
category, for example, is assigned a 100-point value, with a 400-point total being the 
maximum.  Points are assigned based on a vehicle’s design parameter against the 








   Figure 4.2 – Determining Category Points 
             (After McGrady, 1999) 
 
The category points are summed and divided by 400 to obtain a system 






Example:  Payload 
 Design   12,000 














Figure 4.3 - Determining SER  
       (After McGrady, 1999) 
 
 
The derivation of the effectiveness ratio essentially is a measure of how well 
COMBATT satisfies the 1998 HMMWV Operational Requirements Document (ORD) 
specifications.   
 
E. RESALE OF COMBATTS 
 
Another concept seriously considered by those tasked with modernizing and 
sustaining the LTV fleet is the sale of older equipment to finance new procurements.  
Commercially based vehicles such as COMBATT, could be sold back to the commercial 
auto industry, or to the public after the military no longer has any use for them.  This will 
represent additional savings that could be used to finance the purchase of new vehicles.   
There is an agency to assist with this venture.  The Defense Reutilization and 
Marketing Service (DRMS) is a worldwide organization with headquarters in Battle 
Creek, Michigan.  Established in 1972, DRMS is part of a much larger organization, the 
Defense Logistics Agency.  DRMS inventories, evaluates and revalues reusable 
military resources by reusing property or selling it at best prices that saves millions of 
dollars.   
Example:  Category Points 
 Payload    80 
 Mobility    96 
 Transportability   76 
 Reliability and Maintainability 68 
   Total    320 
  (System Effectiveness Ratio  320/400= .80) 
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DRMS oversees a number of Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices 
(DRMOs). Most often, they are located in or near a military installation.  DRMS also 
transfers goods to fill needs in other Government agencies and donates goods to 
community groups, educational institutions, or other recognized nonprofit organizations.  
Goods remaining after these needs have been met are sold to the public in order to 
generate operating revenues.   
Resale of defense materiel has traditionally been limited to excess inventory.  
However, in light of the shrinking Defense budget and in keeping with the best business 
practices, the Army now sees a potentially large, untapped resource in commercially-
based vehicles where aging vehicles may be inadequate and unserviceable for the Army 
but still valuable in the commercial sector or foreign militaries.  In accordance with the 
Federal Property Management Regulations (FPMR), to reduce an agency’s need for 
additional funding for the acquisition of replacement property, “if an agency has personal 
property that needs to be replaced, it can exchange or sell that property and apply the 
exchange allowance or sales proceeds to the acquisition of similar replacement property.” 
(Title 41 U.S.C. Part 101-46.)  An example of this would be funds generated from used 
Army watercraft sales would go back into new watercraft procurement (not tanks or 
trucks.)  This process does not violate Congressional intent for the funding. However, if 
inventory is reported as excess and is to be sold by the DRMS or any other agency, “any 
sales proceeds are forwarded to the miscellaneous receipts accounts at the United States 
Treasury and are not available to the agency disposing of the property.” (Title 41 U.S.C. 
Part 101-46)  Light tactical vehicle sales to the public have taken place recently with the 
sale of many CUCVs and Small Unit Support Vehicles (SUSVs) from National Guard 
units as well as vehicles from TACOM.  The proceeds from these sales went towards the 
purchase of new LTV procurement.   
Currently, DoD has a rebuild contract with AM General to upgrade and refurbish 
HMMWVs for further use.  HMMWVs that are not suitable for the rebuild program are 
little more than residual and do not meet all the U.S. Department of Transportation 
(DOT) motor vehicle safety standards.  They are usually sold for recovery of parts and 
scrap (www.drms.dla.mil.)  This restriction limits their commercial resale value.  The 
civilian version of HMMWV, called “Hummer”, manufactured by AM General, is DOT 
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certified and can be used on U.S. highways.  Vehicles with a commercial heritage, such 
as COMBATT, could easily be made available to the public or commercial sector and 
used on public roads.   
 
F.  SUMMARY  
 
The COMBATT program has shown many real benefits that could be found in 
lower costs to taxpayers, as well as a capable military LTV.  The goal is to save the 
Government money by tapping the auto industry for mass-production vehicles.  The 
majority of the savings would result from a drastic reduction in the operating and support 
costs.   
Operating and Support (O&S) costs are considered critical in the evaluation of 
acquisition alternatives.  Thus far, COMBATT has shown that it has the potential to 
lower life cycle cost.  With today’s budget constraints, this is considered important since 
O&S cost constitutes a major portion of a systems’ life-cycle cost.  It is also important 
that these cost are analyzed early in the acquisition process, preferably design phase, in 
order to prevent long-term commitment to high-maintenance systems.   
In addition to considering O&S cost, one must analyze the cost-effectiveness of a 
program or system.  An analysis of this nature will ensure that we are getting the best 
equipment available for our limited procurement dollars.  It is the job of the Program 
Manager to provide the user with maximum operational capability while remaining 
within budget constraints.   
In the past, commercial based vehicles have been sold to the public, such as the 
CUCV.  DRMS is charged with finding new lives and new non-tax revenues for military 
goods that are no longer needed in active services.  Resale opportunities exist for vehicles 
such as COMBATTs where the commercial resale of used platforms can be carried out 




V.     ANALYSIS OF THE COMBATT PROGRAM 
 
A.       INTRODUCTION  
 
Thus far, the COMBATT program has demonstrated that it is indeed possible for 
DoD to buy commercial vehicles manufactured on a commercial production line.  This 
chapter analyzes the COMBATT program by comparing O&S costs, manning 
requirements, and cost-effectiveness ratios.  Currently, there are 102,784 light tactical 
vehicles on-hand in the Army, the first of which were fielded in 1985.  The Army needs 
approximately 19,000 additional vehicles to meet mission requirements of 121,692 
vehicles (McGrady, 1999.)  These requirements are not expected to change substantially 
between FY 2003 and FY 2010.    
There are two alternatives to be considered to meet the Army’s need for LTVs in 
the Army After Next (AAN) objective force.  They are stated below: 
 
a) Procure improved versions of the current 
HMMWVA2 Model.  Modernized HMMWVs are to meet 
Army XXI requirements found in the updated ORD.   
 
b) Procure a mix of HMMWVs and 
commercial vehicles to meet light tactical vehicle 
requirements.  As the existing HMMWV/CUCV fleet 
reaches the end of its economic useful life, vehicles are 
replaced by either HMMWVs or by commercial vehicles 
manufactured by a domestic automobile company (in 
selected units).   
 
 
Alternative A would result in a LTV force of vehicles that consist of all improved 
versions of the HMMWV.   The primary mission of the improved HMMWV is to provide 
a light tactical wheeled vehicle for command and control, troop transport, light cargo 
transport, shelter carrier, ambulance, towed weapons prime mover, and weapons platform 
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throughout all areas of the battlefield.  It will function as a deployable, mobile platform 
for numerous systems that contribute directly to warfighting (HMMWV ORD.) 
The proposed vehicle will be employed in all Army units requiring light tactical 
vehicle needs regardless of if they need the full capability of that vehicle or not.  This 
alternative will fully represent the ‘pure-fleet’ concept and the associated training 
logistics advantages.  
Alternative B would result in a LTV force of vehicles that will consist of a high-
low mix of HMMWVs and COMBATT vehicles.  COMBATTs can supplement the light 
vehicle fleet by replacing HMMWVs and CUCVs in selected units and assignments 
where the full characteris tics of the HMMWVs are not required.  This will free up current 
and newer HMMWVs for distribution/redistribution to units that have a greater need for 
that platform, such as Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Military 
Police, Signal, Military Intelligence, Medical, Ordnance, Engineer, Chemical, and other 
selected Combat Service Support (CSS) units.   
For the COMBATT, vehicle this would include all units in echelons Corps and 
above as well as units in installation and training support environments that spend a 
preponderance of their time on hard surfaced roads.  It will operate in the rear areas of the 
battlefield.  By replacing over-age CUCVs and selected HMMWVs, COMBATTs would 
provide an updated platform that reduces the average age as well as fill the Army’s 
requirement for light tactical vehicles.  It is envisioned that a commercial vehicle with the 
COMBATT stated essential characteristics would perform the non-combat, logistics and 
administrative missions in these units.  
Estimating the number of systems needed for this alternative will be based on a 
high- low mix.  Based on the current distribution of the basic HMMWV model and all 
CUCVs, it is estimated that up to 50,000 of COMBATT vehicles could serve effectively 
as the low end of the high- low mix of LTVs.  This is only an estimate and should not 




B.  LIFE CYCLE COST ANALYSIS 
 
To determine if a program is cost-effective, one should analyze life cycle cost of 
competing alternative, in accordance with OMB Circular A-94.  Whichever alternative is 
determined to have the lowest cost per unit of effectiveness expressed in present value 
terms for a given amount of benefits is considered most economical (Circular A-94.) 
 
 
1.  Operating and Support Cost (O&S)  
 
The comparative Operations and Support (O&S) cost analysis was conducted to 
determine the estimated resource requirements of the COMBATT alternative for the LTV 
fleet.   It is based on validated LCC estimates received from TACOM Cost Analysis 
Directorate.   The cost for the alternatives includes continuing to maintain old, inherited 
systems until they are replaced by new alternative systems, as well as the cost to maintain 
the new alternative systems.  Therefore, these estimates should be used to provide a 
comparison of the alternatives, and not as a budgetary estimate of a particular alternative 
system’s cost.   
These estimates represent the cost of maintaining a force structure of 50,000 
vehicles for the period FY 1998 to FY 2020.  It is based on data extrapolated from cost 
estimates to maintain a fleet of 121,692 vehicles.  The following table, Figure 5.1, 
provides a comparison of average O&S costs for the improved HMMWV and 
COMBATT.   It shows associated cost to acquire 19,000 vehicles and to continue to own 
and operate the current fleet through FY2020 (McGrady, 1999.)   All cost are presented 







      Figure 5.1 – HMMWV and COMBATT Operation and Support Costs 
 
(After McGrady, 1999) 
 
 
These cost presented above represents the cost of owning and maintaining the 
Army’s LTV fleet of 50,000 vehicles for the period FY1998-FY2020.  The estimates are 
based on the Army’s standard costing methodology.  For this analysis the fleet consist of 
50,000 COMBATTs or HMMWVs.  The total O&S cost estimates are approximately 
$1.9 billion for the improved HMMWV and $1.8 billion for the COMBATT vehicle.  
The difference is a cost avoidance of  $102 million.  COMBATT has a much lower repair 
parts requirement since the systems will be new when fielded and the subsystems that 
have had a high failure rate on the inherited HMMWVs will have been replaced by new, 
improved subsystems which are projected to have a lower failure rate.  Additionally, the 
O&S cost for the commercial variant is less since replacement parts are readily available 
on the commercial marked and, therefore, can be purchased at a lower cost (McGrady, 
1999.)  The training and logistical costs associated with the mixed fleet concept was not 
estimated.  Because of the similarities in the functioning of the systems, operator training 
costs are considered negligible.  Most logistical support will be provided in a CLS 
arrangement, limiting logistics personnel training and also limiting COMBATT unique 











  $M    
OM FUNDED ELEMENTS   
REPL REPARABLES 
(SPARES)  
$      132 $        84 
REPL CONSUMABLES 
(REPAIR PARTS)  
 
$   1,181 
 
$   1,000 
PETRO, OIL AND LUBE 
(POL) 
$     165 $      226 
TRANSPORTATION  $       85 $      144 
TRAINING $     302 $      309 
 
TOTAL O&S COST  
 
$  1,865 
 
$   1,763 
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The Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimate used 5 cost elements which included 
repairables, consumables, petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), transportation and 
training.  The estimates are based on average repair-parts costs as documented in the 
Operating and Support Management Information System (OSMIS) relational database 
and assumed a 15-year useful life for the current HMMWV.  OSMIS is the core of the 
Army Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) program.  
OSMIS tracks operating and support information for over four hundred major Army 
weapon/materiel systems for the US Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center 
(USACEAC). 
 
2.   Maintenance Manpower Analysis    
 
The objective of the Maintenance Manpower Analysis is to estimate the 
maintenance manpower requirements of the COMBATT program in comparison to the 
HMMWV maintenance requirement.  This manpower analysis was completed to provide 
an estimate of the number of organizational and DS/GS leve l maintenance personnel 
required to maintain the total fleet for each alternative.  For the Army, maintenance in 
support of all versions of the HMMWV is performed at three levels:  organizational, 
direct support (DS), and general support (GS).  The primary maintainer at the 
organizational level is the Light Wheel Vehicle Mechanic, MOS 63B.  The primary 
maintainer at the DS/GS level is the Wheel Vehicle Repairer, MOS 63W.  The analysis 
will estimate the amount of manpower that is required for the each level. 
Additionally, the Army National Guard (ARNG) has two organizations designed 
to support the geographical dispersion of their equipment.  The Organizational 
Maintenance Shop (OMS) provides DS and backup organizational maintenance support.  
The OMS supports units/armories on an area basis.  The number of OMS depends upon 
the number of vehicles in an area and the capabilities of the units in that area.  The 
second organization is the Combined Support Maintenance Shop (CSMS) which provides 
DS and backup GS maintenance support.  One or two of these exist in each state.  
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Although an ARNG division may have units in several states, maintenance support is 
organized by state  (McGrady, 1999.)  
The number of maintenance personnel required in a unit, such as a division,  
brigade, or MACOM, is a direct function of the number of support systems, their 
maintenance ratios (MR), usage, and the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 
availability factor for that unit.  The requirements for each variant are then summed for 
all variants in the unit, resulting in an organizational level maintenance manpower 
requirement and a DS/GS maintenance manpower requirement for the unit as computed 
using the formula displayed in Figure 5.2 (McGrady, 1999.)  For each alternative, the 
number of maintainers required to support the fleet is computed by summing the 
requirements computed for each of the units.  The final results are values for each 
alternatives representing the maintenance manpower requirements at organizational and 











              Figure 5.2 – Maintenance Manpower Determination 
    (From McGrady, 1999)  
 
Figure 5.3 provides a summary of the maintenance manpower necessary to 
support each of the vehicle alternatives.  For a fleet of 50,000 light vehicles, maintenance 
manpower requirement estimates range from 1405 maintainers for the improved 
HMMWV to a low of 514 maintainers for COMBATT (McGrady, 1999.)  
 
 
For each group of vehicles in a unit: 
   Maintenance Manpower =  Number of Vehicles  X  MR  X  Usage Rate 




Organic Mechanic (63B) DS/GS Repairer (63W) Fleet Total
Improved HMMWV 1063 342 1405
COMBATT 440 74 514
   
Figure 5.3 – Maintenance Requirements 
                                               (After McGrady, 1999) 
 
As depicted above, the improved HMMWV requires almost three times the 
number of maintainers than are necessary to support COMBATT.   Crew personnel are 
assumed constant between the two alternatives.  However, the number of maintenance 
personnel required among them varied significantly.  An additional 891 maintainer are 
required for the improved HMMWV.  The estimated cost for these additional maintainers 
equates to approximately $16 million dollars as computed in Figure 5.4 below:  
 
Number of Maintainers X Average Salary  = Total Manpower Cost 
  891 X  $18,268   =  $16,276,788  
 
 
   Figure 5.4 - Computing Cost For Additional Maintainers 
 
 
Again, this will represent a cost avoidance because COMBATT will require fewer 
maintainers, thus making those assets available for other duties. The average cost per 
year for each maintainer is $18,268.  This cost represents the military pay and allowances 
for maintenance (non-supervisory) personnel.  It does not include retirement pay or any 
special allowances or bonuses.  Nonetheless, it represents a lower bound of the cost 
difference.    
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3.   Contractor Logistics Support  
 
COMBATT support concepts employ a unique logistics process by using 
commercially available parts, with extensive peacetime use of the automotive dealer 
maintenance network.   This could result in savings in operational and support costs.  The 
maintenance concept for COMBATT features will be operator maintenance equivalent to 
normal ‘owners maintenance’ on the commercial variant of the vehicle platform.  These 
procedures will be outlined in the 10/20 level manuals.  All Direct Support (DS) and 
General Support (GS) maintenance actions will be performed by contractor logistics 
support maintenance agreement in accordance with the prime manufacturer’s warranty. 
Both military and contract personnel will support COMBATT logistically by the 
most cost-effective means available during peacetime with acceptable risk when in 
transition to wartime.  The major automotive companies are backed by a global 
authorized dealer and service network.  Under CLS, an agreement would be made with 
the auto manufacturers that will provide deployed personnel to provide on-site support 
during contingencies and training exercises as required.  Nevertheless, ordering parts 
during deployed exercises would be seamless and transparent.   
Last year, many of the large players in auto industries have banded together to 
create an e-marketplace specific to their industry.  It is called COVISANT.  This is a new 
business-to-business combined internet procuring agreement among the automotive 
suppliers and manufacturers.   COVISANT acts as an intermediary that stocks, sells, and 
distributes auto parts.  It serves as one-stop-shopping for automakers.   Reduced prices 
are offered because of the significant volume of orders it receives from all automakers 
and dealers.   With COVISANT, the military could get reduced prices for commercial 
vehicle repair parts that may be requisitioned through COVISANT.  Next day delivery 
would be available through Federal Express. 
Thinking beyond the active Army, the local National Guard Armories and 
Reserve Centers would be able to get peacetime maintenance support at the local GM, 
Ford, or Dodge dealer rather than from its organic maintenance unit which could be 
55 
located miles away in another town or state, or only functional during weekend and 
annual drill. 
  
C. COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
 
A program is cost-effective if, on the basis of Life Cycle Cost analysis of 
competing alternatives, it is determined to have the lowest costs expressed in present 
value terms for a given amount of benefits (Circular A-94.)  In analyzing the alternatives 
one must determine the cost effectiveness ratio (CE Ratio.)  The CE Ratio reveals the 
average cost per unit of effectiveness.  The cost effective analysis uses the vehicle unit 
cost and its associated system effectiveness ratio (SER) to calculate a cost effectiveness 
ratio as shown in Figure 5.5.  The unit cost is the recurring hardware unit cost.  The 
system effective ratio (SER) provides a quantitative basis for comparison of each 
vehicle’s ability to meet requirements (McGrady, 1999.)  These requirements are Key 
Performance Parameters (KPPs) set forth in the Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD.)   
To compute the cost-effectiveness ratio, one takes the ratio of the cost of each 
alternative and divides by the effectiveness of that alternative.  The most cost-effective 
project has the lowest average cost per unit of effectiveness (smallest CE Ratio.)  This 
analysis is based on the assumption that the SERs for both alternatives apply to the most 
recently signed ORD for HMMWVs.   As previously shown in Chapter 4, the SER for the 
improved HMMWV and COMBATT were computed to be .96 and .82 respectively 
(McGrady, 1999.) 
One additional factor that must be considered in comparing the cost of 
alternatives is the economic useful life.  At a EUL of 10 years for COMBATT and 15 
years for HMMWVs, it is clear that HMMWVs will require one and a half COMBATT 
replacements for every HMMWV over the course of its EUL.  As depicted in Figure 5.5 
below, COMBATT appears to be the most-costly alternative.   The Improved HMMWV 


























Figure 5.5 - Cost Effective Analysis of Alternatives 
 
 
as the Army needs 1.5 COMBATTs for every HMMWV displaced.  The lower SER is 
expected, but as discussed in this thesis, the measures of effectiveness overstate 
requirements for the day-to-day peacetime expected use of the COMBATT.   
As depicted in Figure 5.6 below, there is only a cost savings of $976 per vehicle 
by procuring COMBATT as opposed to the improved HMMWV.  This may not seem 
like much, but when the savings are added to the potential resale (residual) value of 
vehicles to public, the offset is significantly higher at $9,926.  A property’s residual value 
is an estimate of the price that the property could be sold for at the end of the period of 
the purchase or lease.  The assets will have value because they can fill requirements of 
future organizations or because they can be sold.  Residual value is a benefit that is 
speculative at best.  It does not represent savings but does represent a potential value 
(OMB Circular A-94.)  This estimate was derived from the estimated residual value of 
similar, comparably aged property that is currently selling for in commercial markets.  
Therefore, it will require the proceeds from resale to the public that makes 
COMBATT somewhat less expensive.  Additionally, in sustaining the fleet until FY2020, 
the cost avoidance would be approximately $118 million dollars.  This figure represents 
the increased costs in O&S for sustaining a fleet of 50,000 improved HMMWVs as 




For each vehicle : 
Improved HMMWV    $       73,194 
COMBATT     $       72,218  ($48,145 X 1.5) 
Difference     $            976  
Average residual value at 10 yrs.  $         8,950 (represents potential value) 
Total Additional Value for COMBATT: $         9,926  (per vehicle)                                                                             
 
For LTV fleet:  
O&S Savings    $102,000,000  
Manpower Savings   $  16,276,788  
Cost Savings/Avoidance:                $118,276,788 (for sustaining 50,000 vehicles           
                                    thru FY2020)  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
Figure 5.6 - Cost Comparison 
  
As for compliance to the HMMWV ORD, of the 138 overall requirements, there 
are 93 areas that are ‘applicable requirements’ for COMBATT.  These 93 areas are the 
non-combat mission areas for the HMMWV.  With some simple modifications, the 
COMBATT vehicle can satisfy 85 out of 93 overall applicable requirements outlined in 
the HMMWV ORD.  The percent of applicable requirements met or will meet is 91.4% 
(See Appendix B.)  The 8 mission areas which COMBATT couldn’t meet are as follows:  
 
· Ride Quality - Vertical acceleration 45 mph at 4” and halfround to 6mph 
at 12”.  
· Transportability - Air transportable at GCW by C-130 and larger aircraft. 
A minimum of 3 HMMWVs at GVW shall be transportable by C-130 
aircraft using ramp. Can load only 2 COMBATTs in a C-130. 
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· Transportability -All versions using Light variant as base platform shall 
not exceed 180 inches w/o org-removable kits. COMBATT will not meet.  
Length = 244" USMC Requirement. 
· Transportability - Heavy variant @CW shall not exceed 190.5 inches w/o 
org-removable kits. COMBATT will not meet.  Length = 244" USMC 
Requirement. 
· Transportability - Command and control configuration (incl. light utility 
version @CW w/w, 4 combat soldiers, 2 CNR, camo net) by single UH-
60L. 
· High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP). 
· Embedded diagnostics, COMBATT uses commercial. 
· Batteries must meet current US, NATO military standard requirements for 
both configuration & performance.  COMBATT uses commercial low 
maintenance batteries. 
 
The remaining 45 areas are not applicable to COMBATT as they refer to specific 
requirements for which COMBATT is not a serious candidate.  These mission areas 
would be accomplished with special variants of HMMWVs such as the Heavy, Up-
Armored, and Shelter variants. 
 
D. ANALYSIS OF FUTURE FUNDING OF LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLES 
 
The budget for the entire tactical wheeled vehicle (TWV) fleet averages $1 billion 
annually over the period 1998-2012 (Fleetbook, 1998.)  Concurrently, TWV funding for 
HMMWVs will be increasing over the next few years as depicted in Figure 5.7  
Along with increases in the budget for LTV, the procurement costs for LTVs are 
increasing as well.  The improved HMMWVs come with a higher price tag, about 
$73,000 for the basic model.  Current HMMWVA2s are costing DoD about $57,000 for 
the basic model produced at 24 per day.  In comparison, in 1985, DoD was paying 
$28,000 for a basic HMMWV produced at 96 per day. 
  A production type COMBATT vehicle should cost less than a new HMMWV.  
With modifications included, COMBATT would cost approximately $48,000 each, about 
$10,000 cheaper (20%) than the price for of a basic HMMWVA2 model today and 





















Figure 5.7 – HMMWV Funding 
       
Figure 5.8 below shows projected threshold and objective costs for each 
HMMWV variant projected in the updated ORD.  Base vehicle costs are built on current 
contract costs that are predicated on a rate of production of twenty-four (24) vehicles per 
day.  The costs were validated using two different calculation methods to ensure a 
comprehensive and thorough evaluation.  The PM LTV developed the cost estimate, 
which represented a "bottom up" industrial engineering approach that was based on 
independent and parametric estimates for all modifications.  The Directorate for Cost and 
Systems Analysis, U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM), 
performed a formal validation of these detailed costs.  To provide further validation, a 
comparison of an analogous method was applied.  This method examined the growth of 
unit costs for the HMMWV fleet through its evolution and applied that historical rate of 
increase to the current contract prices.  Once the cost increase factors were applied, the 
derived costs were compared to the "bottom up" estimate established by the formal 
validation and found to be in line with the ORD threshold cost numbers (HMMWV 
ORD.)  Block I identifies the four Key Performance Parameters (KPP) for this 
modernization strategy.  It does not include all ORD threshold requirements for the 
improved HMMWV.  Figure 5.8 depicts these costs for Block 1 module below.  All costs 








 Light Utility 2 Man $   80,514 $   73,194 
 Light Utility 4 Man $   81,192 $   73,811 
 Light Weapons Carrier $   96,052 $   87,319 
 Light Weapon Carrier W/W $   98,182 $   89,257 
 Heavy Shelter Carrier $   86,432 $   78,575 
 Heavy Up-Armored  $ 172,112 $ 156,465 
 Light Howitzer Towing $   89,860 $   81,691 
 Ambulance (USMC Soft Top 2-Litter) $   84,465 $   76,786 
 Ambulance (4-Litter and Army 2- Litter) 
  
$ 136,400 $ 124,000 
 
              Figure 5.8 – HMMWV Block Mod 1 
          (From HMMWV ORD) 
 
 
With increasing prices, replacements are not being procured in sufficient 
quantities to replace over-age HMMWVs, complete replacement of CUCVs, and to cover 
attrition.  The replacement interval for the CUCV and HMMWV exceeds the most 
optimistic estimates of the effective service life of the equipment, with 20 year-old 
CUCVs in the inventory by 2005, and 26 year-old HMMWVs by 2013 (Fleetbook, 1998.)  
HMMWV ESP & future LTV procurements currently programmed will not fill the total 
Army requirement for Light Tactical Vehicles of 121,692 vehicles until about 2016.  The 
arithmetic is pretty straightforward.  At current light tactical vehicle funding levels and 
increasing unit costs of the HMMWV, there won’t be many functioning light vehicles in 
the near future.  Additionally, in FY03, the production commences for a HEMTT-II and 
FHTV programs that will compete for limited TWV funding.      
Other events have occurred that have weakened the buying opportunity for new 
LTVs.  As stated previously, the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) only supports 
the effort required to modernize the existing HMMWV and does not include enough 
funding to cover RDT&E and attrition.  The RDT&E funding levels are sufficient only to 
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fund a single contractor effort.  Having only one contractor for the development phase 
locks the program into a sole-source award for production.  As previously mentioned, 
lack of competition for production will potentially increase cost.   
 
E.  RESALE ANALYSIS 
 
For the COMBATT program, the opportunity exists for the vendor and the public 
to buy vehicles originally sold to the military.  At the end of a specified year of the 
contract, the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) would be given the first 
opportunity to buy back all the vehicles initially sold to the Government.  The vehicles 
would be sold at their residual values.  Once sold to the public, cash from the vehicles 
would then be turned into new vehicle manufacturing from the OEM.  A third party may 
also procure the vehicles giving the government freedom to procure new platforms 
through competition between the OEMs.   
Additionally, the vehicles could be sold in a public auction hosted by DRMS.  
The proceeds that the military would receive from this arrangement would be turned back 
into the procurement of similar products.  The resale of COMBATT vehicles to the 
public or back to the commercial industry offers opportunities for recouping dollars spent 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
A.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
During the last few years, the Department of Defense has embarked on an 
ambitious and challenging acquisition reform effort.  Notable changes brought about by 
acquisition reform have allowed COMBATT to become a reality.  The COMBATT 
program was initiated in compliance with the objectives of acquisition reform.  It 
emphasizes the viability of commercial vehicles for certain military missions.  Many 
other examples of this program are apparent as in the rapid acquisition of commercial 
vehicles for the Marine Corps and Army Rangers.   With new changes ongoing in 
acquisition reform, we are now moving from concept to deployment with the best and 
most affordable technology available for our warfighters.   
 If DoD is to have access to the latest technologies developed in commercial 
marketplace, we must continue to build on the reformation of using the commercial 
industry for manufacturing our weapon systems.  This transfer of technology and 
implementation of commercial best practices will result in more examples of dual use 
technology development and utilization.  A unified industrial base provides surge 
capacity and potential manufacturing capabilities that the nation may rely upon in the 
future.  The use of civil-military integration will enhance competition and result in a 
more efficient and innovative base and provide less dependency on sole-source providers.   
Integration makes sense for the COMBATT program.  It will continue to allow us 
to change our way of doing business in order to free up funds for badly needed 
modernization programs.  That said, the Army and Marine Corps cannot accept front line 
units equipped with a commercial derivative for mission reasons.  However, there are 
many missions the COMBATTs can perform.  Many units could meet their operational 
needs with COMBATT alone.  COMBATT would be used to provide command, control 
and communications, medical evacuation, and transport of ammunition, light cargo and 
personnel for Corps and echelon above Corps units that operate in improved areas and 
which do not require a HMMWV level of mobility.  Typical units that COMBATT would 
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fully benefit include combat service support, training, base security, and many units 
throughout the Air Force and Navy. 
Due to budget limitations, the Army is still short of the total HMMWV 
requirement of 121,692 vehicles.  With the current budget constraints and the increasing 
prices of HMMWVs, there isn’t enough money to ‘pure fleet’ our light tactical vehicles.  
With current budget estimates, the replacement interval for the CUCV and HMMWV 
given the current funding profile exceeds the most optimistic estimates with 20 year-old 
CUCVs in the inventory by 2005, and 26 year-old HMMWVs by 2013.  At this rate, 
some HMMWVs may be in the field up to 36 years before they are replaced or 
recapitalized.  In order to meet this requirement in the near future, it is likely that some 
form of commercial vehicle may need to be procured.    
It appears that the commercial automotive producer is technically capable of 
manufacturing robust commercial vehicles that meet many of the requirements of the 
HMMWV at lower O&S costs.  This analysis has shown that COMBATT can lower life 
cycle costs and significantly lower manpower requirements and costs.  It can attain over 
91% of all HMMWV applicable requirements which, in a non-combat environment, 
would be fully mission capable.  The COMBATT program thus far has demonstrated it is 
a marginally more cost effective solution to filling the light tactical vehicle requirement 
deficiencies for the Army.  With COMBATT, the Government acquires vehicles with 
new technology, better safety features, and acceptable mobility.  Then, once the 
Government has used them, they can sale them back to manufacturers at their residual 




Based on the rationale that we buy only the capability that is needed, if we pure 
fleet with one type of truck, the HMMWV, we are paying for additional capability that is 
not needed.  Every unit in the Army does not need a HMMWV.  Some units only need 
basic transportation, plus the capability that COMBATT would provide.  To meet the 
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needs of today’s force at today’s budget, the Army’s buying strategy should include 
purchases of a mix of new commercial trucks and HMMWVs for the light vehicle fleet.   
The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) should revalidate the 
actual need for HMMWV level performance at all Army commands and the other 
services should provide their input.  Additionally, this solution will also be particularly 
accommodating for services that don’t require the extreme capabilities of the HMMWV, 
such as the Air Force or Navy.   
As we saw in Chapter 3, the preponderance of all CUCVs are in the National 
Guard and reserve forces, a total of 90%. With Homeland Defense now being the 
Department of Defense highest priority, the active and reserve forces would benefit 
directly from COMBATT as the operating environment within the U.S. will be conducive 
for a commercial platform that is better fit for primarily on-road driving conditions. 
The COMBATT solution offers a cost effective alternative to fulfill current 
shortfalls in the light truck fleet that exist in the Army today.   
 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This thesis identified areas below that merit additional research:   
 
· Identify what specific units in the Army and Marine Corps should 
have the HMMWVs/COMBATTs. 
 
· Identify what specific units in the Air Force and Navy should have the 
HMMWV/COMBATTs. 
 
· Analyze the benefits of leasing COMBATT vehicles. 
 
· Identify additional future programs where DoD may benefit from 





















































APPENDIX:  A 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
AAN  Army After Next 
ARNG  Army National Guard 
CAS  Cost Accounting Systems 
CLS  Contractor Logistics Support 
COMBATT Commercially Based Tactical Truck 
COTS  Commercial-off-the-shelf 
CSMS  Combined Support Maintenance Shop 
CUCV  Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle 
DEA   Drug Enforcement Agency 
DCSOP Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans  
DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
DOD  Department of Defense 
DOT  Department of Transportation 
DRMS  Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service 
DS   Direct Support 
DUS&T Dual-Use Science & Technology 
ESP  Extended Service Program 
EUL  Economic Useful Life 
FAR   Federal Acquisition Regulation 
FASA  Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act  
FAV  Fast Attack Vehicle 
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FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FPO  Fleet Planning Office 
FPMR  Federal Property Management Regulations  
GAAP  Generally Accepted Accounting Procedures 
GAO   General Accounting Office 
GOTS  Government-off-the-shelf 
GP   General Purpose  
GPS  Global Positioning System 
HMMWV High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
IBCT  Interim Brigade Combat Teams 
IFAV  Interim Fast Attack Vehicle 
INS  Immigration and Naturalization Service 
ITV  Internally Transportable Vehicle 
JMNS  Joint Mission Needs Statement 
KPP  Key Performance Parameter 
LCC  Life Cycle Cost 
LTV  Light Tactical Vehicle 
M-COTS Modified Commercial Off The Shelf  
MEU  Marine Expeditionary Unit  
MILSPECS Military Specifications 
MOE  Measure of Effectiveness 
MOS   Military Occupational Specialty  
MUTT  Military Utility Tactical Truck Project 
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NAC  National Automotive Center 
NATC  Nevada Automotive Test Center 
NDI  Non-development item 
OEM  Original Equipment Manufacture 
ORD  Operational Requirements Document 
O&S  Operation and Support  
OPA  Other Procurement, Army  
OPMIS  Operating and Support Costs Management Information 
OMS  Organizational Maintenance Shop 
OTA  Office of Technology Assessment 
PM  Program Manager 
POL  Petroleum, Oil, & Lubricants 
POM  Program Objective Memorandum  
RDT&E Research Development Test & Evaluation 
RSOV  Ranger Special Operations Vehicle 
SER  System Effectiveness Ratio 
SON  Statement of Need 
TACOM Tank- Automotive and Armaments Command 
TOC   Total Ownership Cost 
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command 
TWV  Tactical Wheeled Vehicle 
USACEAC U.S. Army Cost Economic Analysis Center 
USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics) 
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USMC  United States Marine Corps 
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Commercially Based Tactical Truck 
(COMBATT-military vehicle) 
& 
Enhanced Mobility Commercial Vehicle  
(EMCV-civilian vehicle)  
Program 
  
Vehicle Cost Comparisons  
 
  Prepared by  
 
COMBATT/EMCV  




Cost Estimates for Dodge & Ford COMBATT Vehicles 
Estimated Budget for Production 
Cargo/Troop Carrier COMBATT Vehicles 
Cost Estimates for Body Upgrades 
Base Vehicle:  Dodge or Ford (4wd, Crew quad cab, 
   ABS, PS, PB, trailer pkg, auto trans, air 
   $31,250   Cond., air bags, diesel, speed control) 
 
Upgrades: 
        Body Antenna mounts 
 Brush guards 
 Bumpers – approach angle, tie downs. 
 Fenders rework 
 Fender flares 
 Paint (CARC replacement) 
 Rifle holder 
 Seats – mesh design or heavy duty material 
 Tie downs (pickup box) 
 Trailer pintle – front 
 Trailer pintle – rear 
 Winch mounts front & rear 
 
  
 Section Subtotals 
         Budget 
















   $50 
 $200 
$100 
   $90 





  $75 





   $50 
$200 
$100 
    $0 





   $75 




    $0 
  $50 
    $0 
$100 
    $0 
  $90 







Cost Estimates for Chassis Upgrades 
Cost Estimates for Dodge & Ford COMBATT Vehicles 
Estimated Budget for Production 
Cargo/Troop Carrier COMBATT Vehicles 
Base Vehicle: Dodge or Ford (4wd, Crew quad cab, 
  ABS, PS, PB, trailer pkg, auto trans, air 
  Cond., air bags, diesel, speed control)   
 
 Upgrades: 
      Chassis   Adjustable air springs 
   Air Compressor System 
   Air Dryer 
   Brakes – Mods for 40% grade, parking 
   CTIS($ coordinated w/ axles and air springs) 
   Dampers – Semi Active 
   Frame tie downs 
   Goodyear 37x12.5 R17 tires 
   Lift rings 
   Skid plates 
      Wheels with run flat, 2 piece 
 
    
  Section Subtotals 
Budget 
(Nov 2000 Economics) 
    COMBATT 
    Demo 
    Vehicle 
 
   Base 




    $300 
$1,100 
    $800 
    $200 
$2,300 
$1,000 
    $150 
$1,000 
    $400 




   $300 
   $550 
   $800 
   $200 
       $0 
$1,000 
    $150 
$1,000 
    $400 




   $300 
   $550 
   $800 
   $200 
       $0 
$1,000 
   $150 
$1,000 
       $0 
   $300 






 Cost Estimates for Electronics Upgrades  
Cost Estimates for Dodge & Ford COMBATT Vehicles 
Estimated Budget for Production 
Cargo/Troop Carrier COMBATT Vehicles 
Base Vehicle:  Dodge or Ford (4wd, Crew quad cab, 
   ABS, PS, PB, trailer pkg, auto trans, air 
   Cond., air bags, diesel, speed control) 
 
Upgrades: 
   Electronics   200 Amp alternator 12/24 Volt (mil grade) 
   Air Spring controller 
   Batteries (2 additional for 24 Volt) 
   Black-out lights 
   Engine idle control 
   Integrated flat panel display & Computers 
   Inverter for 120 VAC 
   NATO connectors – cab, box 
   NATO connectors – front & rear jump start 
   Radio mounts (console) 
   Trailer tow wiring 
   Wiring harness overlays 
 
    
             Section Subtotals 
Budget 
(Nov 2000 Economics) 
        COMBATT 
        Demo 








    $600 
    $180 
    $300 
    $175 
$2,500 
    $400 
    $125 
    $350 
    $175 
    $150 




    $600 
    $180 
    $300 
       $0 
       $0 
    $400 
    $125 
    $350 
    $175 
    $150 
    $200 
 
$4,280 
      $0 
   $600 
      $0 
      $0 
      $0 
      $0 
      $0 
      $0 
      $0 
  $175 
       $0 






Cost Estimates for Powertrain & Other 
Cost Estimates for Dodge & Ford COMBATT Vehicles 
Estimated Budget for Production 
Cargo/Troop Carrier COMBATT Vehicles 
Base Vehicle:  Dodge or Ford (4wd, Crew quad cab, 
     ABS, PS, PB, trailer pkg, auto trans, air 
  Cond., air bags, diesel, speed control) 
 
 Upgrades: 
    Powertrain   Axle mods for CTIS 
  Axles/Differentials 
    Fuel filler neck for NATO nozzle 
    Mods for –25 F starting (-20 F is standard) 
    Venting for stream fording (multiple) 
 
   Section Subtotals 
   
Other   Military owners guide 
   Up-fitter assembly price  
 
    
             Section Subtotals 
Budget 
(Nov 2000 Economics) 
            COMBATT 
              Demo 







    $500 
    $500 
      $50 
      $50 
   $100 
$1,200 
     $75 
$3,000 
$3,075 
    $0 
$500 
  $50 









    $0 
$500 
    $0 
    $0 











Cost Estimates - Overall COMBATT 
Cost Estimates for Dodge & Ford COMBATT Vehicles 
Estimated Budget for Production 
Cargo/Troop Carrier COMBATT Vehicles 
Base Vehicle: Dodge or Ford (4wd, Crew quad cab,  
  ABS, PS, PB, trailer pkg, auto trans, air 
  Cond., air bags, diesel, speed control) 
 
Upgrades: 
   Body 
   Chassis 
   Electronics 
   Powertrain 
   Other  
 
   Upgrade Subtotals 
 
Budget 
(Nov 2000 Economics) 
           COMBATT 
           Demo 
            Vehicle 
 
   Base 
  COMBATT 


















   $775 




 Base Vehicle Cost                                $31,250      $31,250          $31,250      
$31,250        $31,250 






• COMBATT Demonstration Vehicle: This vehicle is equipped 
with all technologies, military options, and electronic devices 
developed in this program. 
 
• Base COMBATT Vehicle: This vehicle is equipped with the 
basic technologies developed to upgrade the body, chassis, 
electronics, powertrain, and suspension and includes most military 
options as required by the HMMWV Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD) . 
 
• Base EMCV: This vehicle is equipped the same as the Base 
COMBATT vehicle minus some of the military-specific options. 
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